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Abstract 
 
 
In this study we measure the performance of cooperatives and investor-owned firms in the 
European dairy processing industry. Comparing the performance between cooperatives and 
investor-owned firms requires accounting for differences in their mission and objectives. 
Traditionally, cooperatives were established by farmers to gain access to markets, balance 
market powers and have a  secured and sustainable income. Generally, there is a consensus in 
the economic literature that a cooperative can be defined as a (members)user-owned and 
(members)user-controlled organization that aims to benefit its (members)user. Cooperatives 
are transaction oriented, the members provide themselves with services they could not secure 
otherwise. In addition member are owners and determine the mission and strategy of 
cooperatives equally as the owners of the cooperative enterprise. Our study takes into account 
the consequences of members’ strategies for the cooperatives’ organizational structure and 
subsequently the significance of structure on (technical and economical) efficiencies. 
Although the theoretical literature emphasizes the difference in economic behavior between 
cooperatives and IOFs, the empirical studies have failed to follow up with theoretical 
approaches. The failure of the empirical studies to apply the models proposed by the 
theoretical literature seems to be due to either the inaccessibility of data, the inability to take 
into account the interests of all the various types of members and stakeholders of the 
cooperative, or the difficulty in testing the various hypotheses in practice. An empirical 
analysis of differences in financial indicators between IOFs and cooperatives in six European 
countries shows that cooperatives are less profitable but operationally more efficient, they 
have higher material costs and lower debts than IOFs. Furthermore, cooperatives display a 
substantially greater variation in financial indicators than IOFs. Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
is used to measure and compare the efficiency and production technology of cooperatives and 
IOFs. Cooperatives are found to have a more productive technology than IOFs, but they use 
their production potential less efficiently. A further empirical analysis of technical efficiency 
using Data Envelopment Analysis shows that explicit accounting for the objectives of 
cooperatives generates different outcomes compared with treating cooperatives as if they were 
IOFs. The results of the empirical analyses in this study promote the conclusion that 
measuring the performance of cooperatives as if they were IOFs produces misleading insights 
about the cooperatives’ performance suggesting performance suggesting that cooperatives’ 
performance is influenced by their organizational characteristics and members objectives. 
                  
 
 
Keywords: Cooperatives, IOFs, European dairy industry, logistic regression, stochastic 
frontier analysis,  inter- and intra-firm efficiency, catch-up component,  data envelopment 
analysis, hyperbolic technical efficiency, overall efficiency, scale efficiency,  bootstrapping.  
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Preface 
 
After agreeing with my supervisors on the terms of my PhD and a few weeks before I moved 
to Wageningen, I joined a discussion with a young French professor at the University of 
Amsterdam. This professor, who teaches Financial Economics, was proudly saying how he 
has learned from his students in many issues he thought were trivial. He mentioned a few 
examples where he had to rethink certain approaches, which he always believed to be 
obvious, to certain research questions. At this point, while attempting to take part in this 
discussion, I talked about the difference between cooperative firms (considering their 
relations to their members) and the investor-owned firms (IOFs). I was enthusiastic to explain 
to this professor the complexity of members’ role in their cooperative and how the 
economical literature lacks a proper tool to measure the performance of the cooperatives. He 
reacted instantly saying that members at the cooperatives and owners of the IOFs are the exact 
same thing and that there is nothing special about being a member of a cooperative. He argued 
conclusively that there is no need for different tools or treatment to measure the performance 
of the cooperatives.  And so he left the discussion. I felt annoyed to be honest. On one hand, 
this individual seemed not to be as open-minded as he claimed in order to rethink common 
approaches to this issue that appears obvious to him. On the other hand, I sensed the difficulty 
that I am facing to defend an uncommon idea to main stream economists who are not familiar 
with cooperatives or their added-value to members. This incident raised alarms to me about 
my PhD project, but it also indicated the potential level of people’s tolerance to different 
views than the common ones.  I recall how the work of John Nash was ignored for years 
before being recognized as substantial to Game Theory. Of course, the cooperatives’ 
performance is not comparable to Nash’s non-cooperative equilibrium but the instant 
reaction, by those who work with main stream school of thoughts to certain non-traditional 
ideas, is very similar. And this is exactly what this thesis encountered, especially in the last 
chapters. With the support of my supervisors we started this PhD about the performance of 
cooperatives. This thesis would never come true without the contribution of many. Some 
contributed to the content of the research, while others contributed implicitly in words and 
sometimes by listening to me and provide me some directions and moral support. The idea to 
conduct a PhD on this subject came few years before the actual start of the PhD in June 2005. 
Thanks to Prof. Gert van Dijk, who provided me with all possible support during my master 
thesis in 2003 and then during my PhD. He contributed to my knowledge of cooperatives 
businesses in this part of the world and provided me with the opportunity to talk with him 
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about related and non-related issues. I saw in him a father- figure, who although very busy 
since ever and several times arriving late to our regular meetings, his input in interpreting our 
results is crucial. Another person who contributed substantially to the progress and finalizing 
of this thesis is professor Alfons Oude Lansink. Alfons’ role is far more important to this 
thesis than anyone else involved. He was my promoter and my daily supervisor and had to 
deal with my issues on daily bases. Thank you for all your time and effort and I hope you will 
be proud of me. I want to extend my thanks to the other committee members: Prof. dr. J. 
Nilsson,  Prof. dr. S.W.F. Omta , Prof. dr. ir. J.G.A.J. van der Vorst and Dr. O.F. van 
Bekkum.  There are many people whom their inputs are fundamental and important to my 
personal and academic life and I sincerely appreciate each moment they spend with me or for 
me.  Mentioning all of them will require writing a long and detailed acknowledgement, while 
mentioning some of them will give the impression that I appreciate some people’s 
contribution more than others’. The best way out is not to mention any name of colleagues’, 
friends, or family around the world since I can not find the words which really express my 
appreciation and honor to learn for all of them. The only person, which I hope you allow me 
to mention is my wonderful wife Rashia. Thank you for your patience and love. Always all 
the praise go to the one who enlightened my journey before, during and after the PhD. I 
believe without his supervision, this PhD would not have started nor be finished. Praise be to 
Allah (AWJ) the creator of the worlds and the forgiver of misdeeds, the most knowledgeable 
of the unknown and uncertain, the only one who is informed of the conscience and good 
intentions, who takes note of everything and expands all mercy and wisdom to whomever he 
wishes.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the world cooperatives play an important role in the agricultural sector in general 
and in the dairy sector in particular. In the EU, in particular the northwestern members’ states, 
cooperatives account for a large proportion of the market. In the Netherlands and Denmark, 
for instance, the dairy cooperatives are the market leaders. Providing relevant and accurate 
evaluation of the financial performance of the agricultural cooperatives is not only of 
relevance to the owners of the cooperatives and other stakeholders, but also to policy makers, 
the general public, local communities and academia. Recently, the concern to provide a 
proper evaluation of any firm’s performance in the agri-food sector has intensified due to 
reasons such as the current financial crises, ongoing globalization, changes of environmental 
and food safety requirements, EU enlargement and WTO negotiations on the liberalization of 
the agricultural trade. One of the concerns raised in providing relevant and accurate 
performance measurement, is the comparison of the performance of cooperatives with 
investor-owned firms (IOFs). Providing a relevant comparison of the performance of the two 
types of firms requires an in-depth understanding of their core business objectives. Their 
mission and key objectives explain the differences of their performance. Performance 
measurement in this study refers to the ongoing process of assessing progress towards 
achieving pre-determined objectives (Bourne et al., 2003). 
In the economic literature, studies on the performance of cooperatives and IOFs are 
extensive. However, there is a big gap between the theoretical findings and their empirical 
implementation into performance measurement of cooperatives. When empirically evaluating 
the performance of cooperatives and IOFs, economists tend to accommodate the cooperatives 
by imposing behavioral assumptions (profit maximizing or cost minimizing) that are assumed 
for shareholders-value oriented firms and use tools commonly developed to measure the 
performance of IOFs. When the behavioral assumptions are not valid, imposing them while 
studying and comparing the performance of the cooperatives (as they are member–oriented 
firms) results in biased and irrelevant conclusions.  
Nonetheless, economists who worked on the theoretical understanding of cooperatives 
have pointed out that the differences between cooperatives and IOFs should not be ignored 
and raised their concerns about the appropriateness of implementing the same approach to 
both (see e.g. Albaek and Schultz, 1998; Barton et al. 1996; Bateman et al., 1979; Cotterill, 
1987; Helmberger and Hoos, 1962; Staatz, 1989). In the theoretical literature few authors 
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present alternative approaches to address the differences between the two types of firms (Choi 
and Feinerman, 1993; Murray, 1983; Van Dijk and Klep, 2005). However, these approaches 
are complex and lack the availability of information on prices, equity characteristics or 
ownership structure.  
Dairy cooperatives aim to gain market access for their members and to maximize the 
returns on behalf of their members, whereas IOFs aim at maximizing returns for their owners 
investors. These cooperatives determine the milk price to members by deducting the costs of 
the cooperative firm from total receipts. As a result they are often the regional price leaders. 
IOFs will normally minimize costs of milk for the firm. Milk payment to members by the 
cooperatives includes member performance such as taking liability. Therefore, measuring the 
real price payment to members requires detailed information on the ownership structure of the 
cooperative and its way of capitalization. Additionally, raw materials (milk from the 
members) play a different role for cooperatives than for IOFs. Raw materials to the 
cooperatives are the output of their owners (members) and cooperatives are expected to 
expand the use of these materials and pay a higher total price for them, contrary to what the 
IOFs would aim, i.e., to use the quantity of materials which optimize profits since materials 
are considered other input. The lack of information and the differences on what materials and 
capitalization are to cooperatives make it difficult to implement some of the theoretical 
models, especially when performance is to be compared across different organizations and 
countries. Additionally, empirical studies on differences between European dairy cooperatives 
and IOFs are lacking when it comes to the differences of their technical and economical 
performance and distinguishing the cooperatives from the IOFs in terms of financial ratios 
and other variables.  
This thesis contains a review of the literature to highlight the actual gap between what 
has been theoretically developed and what is actually implemented empirically in measuring 
the performance of cooperatives. Starting with the gap in the literature and the lack of 
empirical studies on the European dairy sector, the research conducted in this thesis attempts 
to investigate empirically whether dairy cooperatives have different patterns in terms of their 
financial figure from the IOFs in six main milk producing countries in the EU. In addition the 
research in this thesis uses econometrical and programming tools to evaluate the differences 
in technical and allocative performance of dairy cooperatives and IOFs and adapts these tools 
according to the objectives of the cooperatives.        
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1.2 Objective of the Study 
 
The objectives are to develop performance measurement and to empirically compare the 
performance of dairy processing cooperatives (as members-oriented firms) and IOFs (as 
shareholder-value oriented firms). More specifically, this thesis aims: 
 
i) To review the literature on measuring the performance of cooperatives in 
comparison to IOFs.  
ii) To empirically investigate whether cooperatives and IOFs can be distinguished in 
terms of their financial ratios and other variables as a consequence of the 
difference in their orientation.  
iii) To measure and compare the technical and economical performance of dairy 
cooperatives and IOFs’ using commonly applied approaches. 
iv) Finally, to evaluate the technical efficiency of cooperatives by adjusting the 
commonly used approaches to address their members’ orientation.  
 
 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 starts by providing a review of the theoretical and empirical economic literature on 
measurement and comparison of the cooperatives’ performance. This chapter presents a 
categorization of the theoretical and empirical literature and brings a systematic review of the 
gap between the theoretical and empirical economic literature on measuring the performance 
of cooperatives versus IOFs.  
Chapter 3 uses logistic regression to investigate which financial characteristics 
differentiate European dairy cooperatives from IOFs. The empirical classification provides 
insights into differences in financial ratios and other factors between IOFs and cooperatives in 
the European sector of dairy processing firms. The distinguishing financial aspects indicate 
the financial ability and flexibility of these two different types of firms to cope with future 
challenges faced by the dairy industry.  
In Chapter 4, using stochastic frontier analysis, we evaluate the performance of dairy 
cooperatives and IOFs in terms of their technical efficiencies and production technologies. 
The methodological approach uses a different frontier for each type of firm, allowing for 
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measuring technical efficiency of the firm with respect to its own frontier (intra-firm 
efficiency) and the difference between the two frontiers (catch-up component). 
  In Chapter 5, using Data Envelopment Analysis, we measure and compare the overall 
efficiency of dairy processing firms of the two types; additionally, we provide two hyperbolic 
technical efficiency measurements. The first hyperbolic measurement suggests that dairy 
processing firms radially expand output and contract all inputs, including materials (mainly 
raw milk) at the same time with equal proportions. The second hyperbolic measurement 
incorporates the nature of cooperatives (as members oriented) and suggests that firms radially 
expand both output and materials and contract other inputs at the same time.  
Chapters 3-5 use the same data base on dairy processing firms in six European 
countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland and the Netherlands.        
Chapter 6 highlights the main results, presents conclusions and provides a discussion 
of the theoretical, methodological and empirical issues.  
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Abstract 
 
 
The performance of the agricultural cooperatives depends on their business objective(s) which 
is(are) defined in different ways in the literature. In this chapter we review the theoretical 
literature on the performance of agricultural marketing cooperatives according to a class that 
assumes a single objective and a class that assumes multiple objectives. This classification 
integrates three views of the cooperatives: 1) vertical integration of firms, 2) independent 
enterprise and 3) coalition of firms. Empirical studies on the financial performance of the 
cooperatives are classified into two categories: studies that are based on the economic theory 
of the firm and studies that emphasize accounting techniques. In this chapter we conclude that 
empirical studies have failed to address the cooperatives’ objectives as represented by the 
theoretical literature on cooperatives’ performance.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives, Cooperative Performance Measurements, 
Financial Ratios and the Performance of the Cooperative. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we review the theoretical and empirical economic literature on the performance 
of agricultural marketing (AM) cooperatives. Performance measurement is the ongoing 
process of assessing progress towards achieving predetermined objectives (Bourne et al., 
2003). However, in the case of a cooperative, the firm and its objective(s) are not easily 
defined. Generally, there is a consensus in the economic literature that a cooperative can be 
defined as a user-owned and user-controlled organization that aims to benefit its members 
(Sexton and Iskow, 1988). As owners (residual claimants), members are entitled to the net 
income generated by the firm, but are also the residual risk bearers of the firm’s net cash 
flows. As controllers, members have the residual right to control any assets that are not 
assigned to other parties or attenuated by law (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). Members generally 
benefit from their cooperative in proportion to their use (Barton, 1993). According to 
Helmberger and Hoos, (1962) the prime objective of the cooperative is to provide stability 
and optimal growth conditions for its members. Since there are a wide variety of cooperatives, 
we focus on agricultural marketing cooperatives.  
 Cooperatives differ widely in constitution, aspirations and business organization. With 
regard to organizational form and objectives, cooperatives may show as much variation as we 
find between cooperatives and investor-owned firms (LeVay, 1983). Facing the 
industrialization of farming and agribusiness, (traditional) cooperatives introduce different 
organizational innovations, e.g. new-generation cooperatives, partnership of limited liability 
company cooperatives and equity-seeking joint ventures (Cook and Chaddad, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the vast literature with regard to other types of cooperatives, we limit our 
analyses to the theoretical behavioral models of AM cooperatives. Nevertheless, it is 
important to state that some important contributions have been done outside this realm of 
agricultural marketing cooperatives; see for example Bonin, Jones and Putterman’s work on 
producer cooperatives (1993).   
 Both the definition of cooperatives and the heterogeneity of their organizational forms 
are stumbling blocks in analyzing the performance of AM cooperatives. In order to develop 
manageable models of economic performance, various authors assign either single-objective 
goals or multiple-objective goals to AM cooperatives. Furthermore, cooperatives are 
generally viewed in three classes: vertically integrated, independent or coalition. As a result, 
the literature on AM cooperative economic performance consists of a heterogeneous list of 
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theoretical and empirical studies. An overview of those studies linking theoretical and 
empirical approaches to the cooperative’s performance is lacking.       
The theory focuses on the distinction between the profit-maximizing objective of the 
IOF and other goals that reflect the dual nature of the cooperative, i.e., member benefits and 
firm profitability. The assumed objective of the cooperative model often significantly alters 
the behavioral propositions. The theoretical economic literature on cooperatives has 
maintained three distinct views on cooperative firms: the cooperative as (a) a vertically 
integrated firm, (b) an independent business enterprise, and (c) a coalition of firms.  
Economists studying cooperative performance have viewed the cooperative as an 
independent firm with a single objective. The lack of empirical evidence for assuming the 
other two views appears to be the result of either difficulties in obtaining the relevant data or 
the applicability of the theoretical models based on these two views. Empirical studies that 
use accounting tools (i.e., financial ratios) or efficiency measurement techniques (i.e., 
stochastic frontier analysis) are mainly focused on comparing cooperatives with investor-
owned firms (IOFs).  
The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, we review the economic literature on 
models that describe AM cooperative performance. Performance measurement is linked to 
firms’ objective(s) and the economic literature. Second, we review the empirical studies on 
performance measurement of AM cooperatives. Third, we discuss discrepancies between the 
conceptual models and the empirical studies on AM cooperatives.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Modeling the Cooperative’s Economic Objectives 
 
The raison d’être of AM cooperatives can be found at the level of members’ farms. Farmers 
began cooperating in order to have a countervailing power, gain access to industrially 
produced goods and services, realize economies of scale, manage their risk, and improve their 
own income (Van Dijk, 1997). Cooperatives are successful if they provide service to their 
members in excess of what they can achieve individually or outside of the cooperative. 
Although cooperatives also provide non-economic benefits1 to their members, our focus here 
is on the economic performance of cooperatives. By establishing cooperatives with defined 
roles for members, members ensure that transaction-specific investments are less prone to 
opportunism.  
                                                 
1
 Such as: participating in a democratic organization, contributing on the local community’s development, strengthening the social bonds 
among members, or any non-economic benefits.   
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Likewise, cooperatives commonly perform as price leaders and stabilize prices for 
farm products. Additionally, as they invest in their cooperative business, farmers obtain 
returns on their investments. Members of AM cooperatives decide on the cooperative’s 
retained earnings, investments, and farmers’ output price. However, since price is related to 
the retained earnings and investments, and because the prices of the farm product represent a 
cost to the cooperative firm, the cooperative’s profit is not, generally speaking, a useful 
measurement of its performance.  
Traditional cooperatives source capital from reservations, up-front investments, debt 
instruments and member contributions. Traditional cooperatives are characterized by 
ownership restricted to members, open membership, redeem-ability of non-transformed 
residual claims, benefits only to patrons and “one-member, one-vote” (Cook and Chaddad, 
2004). In order to keep up with the consolidation in the agribusiness and food industries, 
cooperatives are changing and employing various organizational innovations. These 
organizational innovations include the new generation cooperative, partnerships, member-
investor cooperatives and equity-seeking joint ventures (Chaddad and Cook, 2004).   
Economists studying the AM cooperative either assign one objective or multiple 
objectives to the cooperative. Traditionally, the economic literature on cooperatives has 
maintained three distinct views of cooperatives. This distinction of three views was presented 
first by Sosnick (1960) discussed later by Garoyan (1983) and implemented by Staatz (1989) 
and Cook et al., (2004) as follows: 
(a) The cooperative as a vertical integration of otherwise autonomous firms. Its 
primary objective is to conduct an optimal marketing program for its members.  
(b) The cooperative as an independent business enterprise. Its primary objective is to 
maximize benefits  for its owners.  
(c) The cooperative as a coalition of firms.  
In this chapter we do not ignore this classification from the theoretical literature, but we 
present the literature and the three views according to the number of assumed objectives for 
the AM cooperatives, i.e., single- or multiple-objective. Both of the first two views, i.e., 
vertical integration and independent firm, assume a single-objective cooperative, while the 
cooperative as a coalition of firms assumes multiple objectives. Table 1.1 provides an 
overview of the studies and the objectives of the cooperatives as suggested by the different 
authors. 
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Table 2.1: Overview of the Studies on the Economic Behavior of the AM Cooperatives 
 
* VI: vertical integration; IF: independent firm; CF: coalition of firms 
 
The theoretical approaches presented in Table 2.1 predict different outcomes in terms 
of the price paid to members, profit of the cooperative and the quantity processed. The price 
paid to members refers to the payment members receive for their products. The profit of the 
cooperative is defined as the difference between total revenues and total cost. The quantity 
processed refers to the total output produced by the cooperative. Table 2.2 provides a 
comparison between the different theoretical views of the cooperative. 
 Authors Assigned objective(s) 
 
VI* Emelianoff (1942); Phillips (1953); Robotka (1957); Sexton and Iskow 
(1988) 
To maximize benefits to members (i.e. to maximize both 
the price paid and the dividends’ value) 
Lopez and Spreen (1985); Sexton et 
al. (1989); Marcoul and Hueth; 
Botens and Fulton (2005) 
To maximize the profit of the cooperative firm 
Cotterill (1997) To maximize total members’ welfare 
Enke (1945); Carson (1979) To maximize the (weighted) sum of cooperative’s profit 
and members’ profit. 
Van Sickle and Ladd (1983); 
Albaek and Schultz (1998); 
Falk(2002);Welch et al.(2007). 
To maximize prices paid to members unit of delivery 
(resulting in higher profit/income for members). Each 
member only internalizes his/her own profit (loss) 
independent of other members. 
Feinerman and Falkovitz (1991); 
Vercammen et al.(1996) To maximize members’ profit subject to constraints 
Choi and Fienerman (1993)  To maximize the profit of one group (of members) subject to a constraint on the profit of the other group 
IF 
Helmberger en Hoos (1962) To maximize the dividends to members. 
Murray (1983);  Worley et al. 
(2000)  
To optimize the join benefit of members and managers, 
while bargaining the financing arrangement of the 
cooperative. 
Staatz (1983) 
To optimize the joined benefit of the coalition while 
bargaining among heterogeneous members about how to 
distribute the net benefit. 
Sexton(1986) To provide benefits at least as great as those attainable 
elsewhere. 
Shaffer (1987) To minimize the sum of production and transaction cost. 
Cook (1995) To collectively optimize the members’ benefits. 
Fulton et al. (1998) To achieve economies of size, to minimize cost and to 
maximize growth opportunities. 
Fullton and Giannakas (2001) To provide the joined benefits to members. 
Karantininis and Zago (2001) To achieve better farmers’ returns in open membership 
cooperatives. 
Sykuta and Cook (2001); 
 Boland et al. (2007) To optimize the joined benefit of the members’ coalition 
Hendrikse and Bijman, (2002) To obtain the optimal chain benefit by coordinating the investment on three different tiers of the chain. 
CF 
Cook and Chaddad(2004); Chaddad 
and Cook (2004) 
To improve members’ returns either by protecting current 
and future value of farm assets (defensive) or by adding 
value to farm assets. 
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Table: 2.2: Major Differences of the Different Theoretical Views of Cooperatives  
 Single objective Multiple objectives 
View of the 
cooperative as 
Vertical 
integrated 
firm 
A form of an independent firm  
 
     (1)               (2)                 (3)                    (4) 
Coalition  of firms 
 
Assigned 
objective(s) to 
maximize 
Members 
return after 
paying the 
highest 
possible 
price for 
their 
products 
Profit Patronage funds 
Sum of 
cooperative 
and 
members 
profit 
Output 
(member-
ship) 
optimizatio
n 
The allocation of the 
optimal profit across 
the different parties 
(i.e. different members’ 
categories, managers’ 
board etc) 
 
 
 
Decision 
maker(s) Members 
only 
Managers 
only 
Managers 
only 
Managers 
only 
Managers 
only 
Not centralized & 
depends on the 
negotiation among the 
different parties. Day to 
day decisions are the 
manager’s 
responsibility. 
 
Payment 
(price) to 
members’ 
products 
Highest (6) Lowest(1) High (5) Medium+(4) Low(2) 
 
Depends on negotiation 
& compromise across 
the different groups 
(normally medium 
values) 
 
 
 
Quantity 
processed Low (2) Medium+(4) Lowest(1) Medium- (3) Highest(6) 
Depends on  
negotiation process 
(usually high enough to 
process all members’ 
production) 
Profit of the 
cooperative lowest- (1) Highest (6) Low (2) Medium (4) Medium(3) 
Depends on 
negotiation. Normally 
upper medium to high 
 
Performance 
indicator 
Gross price 
and 
dividends 
Profit-ability Dividends 
Profitability  
& net price 
payment to 
members 
Turnover 
(output 
size) 
Profit to each side 
involved 
 
 
This chapter only reviews the economic literature on the performance of AM 
cooperatives, focusing mainly on the literature that suggests implicit or explicit cooperative 
objective(s).  
 
2.2.1 Literature Assuming a Single-Objective to Cooperatives 
The largest part of the existing theoretical work on AM cooperatives assumes a single, well-
defined objective. The cooperative as (1) a vertically integrated or (2) an independent firm are 
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examples in the literature of single-objective. The view of the cooperative as a vertically-
integrated firm considers the decision-making process as consisting solely of members, while 
the view of the cooperative as an independent firm considers the decision-making process to 
be solely, or primarily, in the hand of the manager(s).  
 
The Cooperative as a Vertically Integrated Entity 
In the absence of the conditions of a perfectly competitive market, producers mutually join 
together in a vertically integrated entity to secure the output flow in the downstream stage of 
the supply chain and to achieve the optimal return for the farmer-member (Van Dijk and 
Klep, 2005). This optimal return can be reached by increasing the price paid by the 
cooperative for farm products, increasing the price paid by the customers for the processed 
product, reducing the processing cost, reducing framers’ income-risk or a combination of all 
the above (Sexton and Iskow, 1989). Emelianoff (1942) was the first to analyze the 
cooperative as a form of vertical integration. Robotka (1957) developed this view further and 
Phillips (1953) formalized it into a model of cooperative output and pricing decisions. Sexton 
and Iskow (1989) provided a lengthy report on the factors critical to the success of joint 
vertical integrated cooperative. The vertically integrated cooperative is all about members’ 
objectives. Members are considered to be the absolute decision makers, with no objectives of  
their own and no preferences. In this approach, the pricing and output rules imply that all 
member firms produce at a point where their aggregate marginal costs of production are equal 
to the marginal revenue gained by the cooperative. The performance of such a firm is not only 
reflected in the prices that members receive for the products they market through the 
cooperative, but also through patronage refunds (Sexton and Iskow, 1989). Therefore, the 
vertical integration view focuses on maximizing members return (patronage refund) per unit 
of input after paying the highest possible price for members’ products in comparison to prices 
paid by other firms in the industry. 
 Members want an equal or higher price than that paid by any other firm in addition to 
the optimal value of dividends; all without taking into account other costs or producer surplus. 
Members of a vertically integrated cooperative focus on the gross price they receive for their 
products in comparison to those that can be obtained from other firms, while having little 
interest in the net price, which can be substantially different (Bateman et al., 1979). The 
vertically integrated cooperative resembles the traditional cooperative in the sense that 
members’ ownership and control are absolute. Let Qi and ρi denote the output quantity and 
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price, respectively, of cooperative i; qi and µi denote the total quantity supplied by the 
members and the price paid by the cooperative i to its members; Ni is the number of members 
and Ci (Qi) is a cost function incorporating all other costs as a function of the total quantity 
produced by the cooperative. Assuming a perfectly competitive market, the objective function 
of the vertically integrated agricultural marketing cooperative is: 
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 On the one hand, the vertically integrated view of cooperatives predicts the highest µi 
paid to members’ product and the optimal level of dividend. On the other hand, it predicts 
zero (or substantially low) profit value of the cooperative and suggests no retained equity-
capital. The performance indicators of the vertically integrated cooperative are both prices 
paid to members and the return on patronage that they receive at the end of the accounting 
year.    
 
 
The Cooperative as an Independent Firm 
The economists who view the cooperative as an independent firm studied the cooperative in 
two ways: (i) as an IOF or (ii) as a variant of it. Both views consider the cooperative as a firm 
managed by entrepreneurs (as the absolute decision makers) who seek to achieve the 
cooperatives’ single objective, discarding members’ objectives in the decision-making 
process.  
 (i) Viewing the cooperative as an IOF, within the context of the traditional theory of 
the firm, assumes that the goal of the cooperative is profit maximization (Williamson, 1964). 
The optimal prices and quantities are determined by setting the cooperative’s marginal cost 
equal to the marginal revenue and therefore the cooperative’s profit is the main performance 
indicator. Studying the cooperative as an IOF assumes profit maximization as its single 
objective. These studies generally compare the performance of the cooperatives with the 
performance of the IOFs (Sexton and Iskow, 1993).  
 Viewing the cooperative as a profit-maximizing firm suggests ignoring members’ 
objectives and considering the price paid for their product as an additional variable cost. The 
profit-oriented cooperative is expected to pay the lowest possible price for members’ products 
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to achieve the optimal profit level. Assuming a perfectly competitive market, the maximizing 
function of the profit maximizing AM cooperative is: 
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 (ii) Studying the cooperative as a variant of an IOF assumes a single-objective 
cooperative. Stephan Enke (1945) was the first to analyze the cooperative as a special type of 
independent firm. Enke concluded that in a monopoly, or monopolistic competitive situation, 
the welfare of both the members of the cooperative and society as a whole is maximized when 
the manager of an input cooperative maximizes the sum of the cooperative’s profit and the 
members’ profit from lower prices. Carson (1979) presented a “generalized welfare-
maximizing firm,” which is basically a weighted sum of stakeholders’ profits. Helmberger 
and Hoos (1962) suggested that the cooperative’s manager seeks to maximize member benefit 
by maximizing the average per-unit cooperative profit to the farmer. Bateman et al., (1979); 
Boyle (2004); Cotterill (1987); and Le Vay (1983) outlined the consequences of choosing 
different objectives for the cooperative’s market behavior and its implication for financial 
issues. Among the suggested alternative single objectives are: (1) maximize the joint profit of 
the cooperative’s and members’ profit, (2) maximize the return to patronage, and (3) 
maximize the size of the total output (or membership). 
 (1) Maximizing the joint profit is explained as members seeking to maximize profits 
on both the inputs and outputs of their cooperatives. The joint profit maximization is 
represented by the total profits of both the cooperative and member firms. The allocation of 
the profit is assumed to be distributed equally between member firms and the cooperative firm 
as the same people both supply the raw input and own the processing plant. This approach 
(assuming equal weights α) is restricted and indicates that the cooperative gives equal 
importance to the profit of the cooperatives and members’ farm profit. Adding a weight factor 
)(α allows for generalizing the model to indicate that some cooperatives may place more or 
less importance on their members’ farm profit rather than on the cooperative’s profit. The 
objective of the cooperative in this model is represented by a well-behaved single objective 
function assuming a centralized production entity which produces the optimal quantity i.e. the 
quantity which optimizes the joint profit of the cooperative and its members. The joint profit 
cooperative model is expected to predict a medium level of both: payment to members and 
profit of the cooperative, but is expected to predict a relatively high level of production 
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volume (Royer, forthcoming). For the joint profit cooperatives, the performance indicators are 
both the profit of the cooperative firm and the aggregated profit of the member firms. The 
formal model of the joint profit firm is:  
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in which inq  refers to the quantity produced by n members and Cn ( inq ) is the cost function of 
the nth members to produce inq and )(α )1,0(∈ reflects the importance weight, which are 
assumed to be equal in programme (3).  
 (2) Maximizing the return to patronage is equivalent to maximizing the dividend to the 
members. This view focuses solely on the return to patronage and ignores members’ interests 
in the price of their product. This objective of the cooperative is expected to predict a 
reasonably high level of payments for members’ products while producing low levels of 
cooperative profit and is also expected to process a very limited volume of production 
(Bateman et al., 1979). For such a cooperative, the performance indicator is the value of 
dividends, which is measured in accordance with the business members’ conduct with their 
cooperative, i.e., the return to patronage. The formal model in this case is: 
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in which Sni refers to a member’s n amount of business conducted with cooperative i.  
 (3) Maximizing output (turnover) as an objective focuses on processing as much 
product as members optimally produce and having the capacity to anticipate the potential 
increase in the supply of raw material. This objective is subject to the constraint that sufficient 
return is made in order to pay out the total costs. In this approach, as done in Albaek and 
Schulz (1998), a cooperative is committed to let every n member choose their profit 
maximizing quantity (qin*) given a purchase price (µi ), making sure the cooperative’s viability 
condition holds. Note here that the production quantity is decentralized; unlike in programme 
(3), in the sense that each member is free to choose the quantity he wants to produce. The 
success of the cooperative is determined in terms of its volume, which is measured by the 
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total turnover. The total output is determined by the quantity produced by members. The 
payment to members as well as the profit of the cooperative is expected to be low. This model 
predicts the optimal capacity of the cooperative in processing members’ (both current and 
potential future members) inputs. The formal model of the size-maximizing cooperative is: 
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2.2.2 Literature Assuming Cooperatives to have Multiple Objectives  
Viewing the cooperative as a coalition of firms is basically assigning multiple objectives to 
the cooperative. The coalition can be formed between firms such as, but not limited to 
heterogeneous member groups, managers, non-member customers and non-member 
shareholders, in which each firm has its own objective. These firms participate in the 
organization as long as a compromise set of decisions is reached. The objective of the 
different groups can be conflicting, in which a compromise decision will be reached as a 
result of bargaining processes. Therefore, the decision making unit is assumed to consist of 
many parties within the cooperative. 
The economical behavior of the cooperative as a coalition assumes that each 
participant maximizes its own profits subject to the existence of the cooperative. The business 
relationship among the various stakeholders of the cooperative can be organized either via a 
set of explicit and implicit contracts or a settlement of bargaining processes using game 
theoretical approaches. These approaches combine characteristics of markets and internal 
(integrated) coordination in ways that are different from either the view of the cooperative as 
a form of vertical integration or the view of the cooperative as an independent firm (Sexton, 
1984; Shaffer, 1987; Van Dijk and Klep, 2005). These multiple-objective views regard the 
cooperative as an entity that is legally separated from its member firms with its own 
administrative and decision-making units, although final control lies with the members via the 
board of directors.  
Early authors with this view (e.g., Kaarlehto, 1955; Ohm, 1956; Pichette, 1972; 
Trifon, 1961) have focused on situations where conflicts could arise between the farmer 
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members and the other participants in the cooperative. Recently authors have integrated 
approaches such as agency theory (Eilers and Hanf, 1999), property rights (Cook and 
Chaddad, 2004), contracting (Sykuta and Cook, 2001), transaction costs (Hendrikse and 
Bijman, 2002) and game theories (Karantininis and Zago, 2001) in their efforts to explain the 
economic characteristics of cooperatives. These approaches, although useful in explaining the 
behavior of the cooperative as a coalition, are not empirically useful in evaluating the 
performance of cooperatives. 
Constructing a formal model for such a cooperative is not only problematic, but also 
requires strong assumptions to define the different sides (and their objectives) and their 
relations to each other. Among these different groups are: new and active members, old (in-
active) members and non-member shareholders. The proportion of the total profit allocated to 
each side is settled through bargaining and negotiation processes that reflect each party’s 
weight and influence. Therefore, the payment to members, the quantity processed and the 
profit of the cooperatives depend on the bargaining power of each party involved. The formal 
model predicts that each side maximizes its own proportion of the cooperative’s optimal 
profit.  
The formal model can be expressed in two stages. In the first stage, the cooperative 
maximizes its own profit (as an independent firm) given prices and quantities decided at a 
previous annual meeting. In the second stage, each party maximizes its own proportion of this 
profit:  
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in which tipi  is the profit at year t, which depends on the output price of year t, quantities 
decided on year t-1 to be produced at year t, and members’ prices at year t decided on year (t-
1).  
 
Stage 2 
Each party maximizes its share in total profit mα , which is a function of mz that reflects the 
bargaining power of party m.   
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 The combined programme (6 & 7) differs from both programme (2) and programme 
(3). Programme (6) has a single profit objective similar to the one in (2) but it is combined 
with programme (7) which generalizes the profit allocation rule of programme (3). 
Programme (7) incorporates the interest (could be unequal) of several stakeholders within the 
cooperative (i.e. cooperative’s profit, objectives of active members, non active members and 
non-members shareholders), while programme (3) is restricted to two stakeholders with equal 
profit weights. The performance indicators are reflected in the profit per party in the coalition. 
To illustrate a typical situation of a cooperative as a coalition of firms, we consider a simple 
example with only two involved groups: active members and inactive members. The active 
members need (beside the optimal return to patronage) a high price for their product. The 
inactive members however, care only about maximizing the return to membership. Formally, 
the interests of these two different groups can be represented as follows: 
 iS1 is the number of active members and iS2 is the number of in-active members. The 
objective of the inactive members is simply to maximize the dividend per total number of 
members (active and inactive ones). The maximizing function for the M ( iS1 + iS2 ) members 
would be: 
 
)}/())()(({ 21
i
iiiiiiiiiiQ
SSQCqqQDMax +−−= µρ                                                 (8) 
         
However, for the active members, in addition to maximizing the return to patronage, the 
objective includes receiving the highest price (in comparison with other firms) for their farm’s 
production. Active members are assumed to prefer a higher payment for their production 
rather than a return to patronage. The objective function for the iS1  members would be: 
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In which )(γ represents the importance’s weight of each part, which depends on the 
bargaining power of the active members vis-à-vis the cooperative.    
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This implies paying a high price µi for the iS1  member products. In this cooperative, the value 
of µi, which is paid to the iS1  active members, is the core issue in the bargaining process. 
 
2.3 Empirical Studies of the Cooperative’s Performance 
Empirical studies are mainly focused on implementing the behavior model of cooperatives as 
a profit-maximizing firm. So far in this field (AM cooperative), empirical applications of the 
other existing models (described above) do not exist. The lack of empirical application can be 
explained as a result of difficulty in obtaining the relevant data (if they exist at all), lack of 
interest on the part of applied economists or lack of theoretical approaches that are well 
developed for empirical application.  
The existing empirical studies on the performance measurement of the AM 
cooperatives, viewing them as profit-maximizing firms, can be classified into two categories. 
The first category consists of studies that measure financial and other types of economic 
ratios. The second category consists of studies that measure (economic) efficiency (Sexton 
and Iskow). The empirical studies that use financial ratios which do not rely on any formal 
behavioral model and may be considered ad-hoc studies dominating the literature concerning 
the financial performance of AM cooperatives.   
In Table 2.3 we present the empirical studies on the performance of the cooperatives in 
various industries and countries, all of which apply different tools. The overview in table 3 
shows that the greatest number of empirical studies focuses on U.S. cooperatives. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the performance of the dairy sector has been intensively 
studied and financial ratios were used more frequently than economic efficiency 
measurements. Techniques measuring economic efficiency were never applied to European 
data. Only four studies implemented other types of ratios other than the classical financial 
ratios as typically used in accountancy literature. 
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Table 2.3: List of Empirical Studies on the Performance of Cooperatives 
 
 
 
Source 
Year 
Data period Sector Country Performance measurement 
Porter & Scully (1987) 1973-1983 Dairy  USA Production function. 
Sexton et al. (1989) 1980-1987 Cotton  USA Allocative efficiency 
Akridge & Hertel  (1992) 
 
1980-1990 Grain & supply  USA Cost efficiency 
Featherstone & Rahman 
(1996) 
1979-1988 Several agricultural 
sectors  
USA Productive efficiency 
Sueyoshi et al. (1998) 1988 Several agricultural 
sectors  
Japan Production index comparative 
cost index & reduction ratio 
Ariyaratne, et al. (2000) 1988-1992 Grain & supply  USA X-efficiency & Scale- 
efficiency 
Doucouliagos & Hone 
(2000) 
1969-1996 Dairy  Australia Technical efficiency 
Singh et al. (2001) 1996 Dairy  India Economic efficiency  
Mosheim (2002) 1982-1993 Coffee  Costa Rica Cost efficiency  
Boyle (2004) 1961-1987 Dairy  Ireland Economic efficiency 
Hailu et al. (2005) 1984-2001 Fruits & vegetable  Canada Technical efficiency  
Ling & Liebrand (1998) 1986-1996 Dairy  USA Extra value index & Return on 
equity 
Parcell et al. (1998) 1996 Dry edible bean  USA SWOT & Sensitivity analysis 
Ebneth & Theuvsen 
(2005) 
2001-2004 Dairy  Germany Foreign sales index & 
Network spread index 
Ling (2006)  1992-1996;  
2000-04 
Dairy  
 
USA Extra value index with 
different values of interest rate 
Schrader et al. (1985 ) 1979-1983 Dairy, grain & farm 
supply  
USA ROE, Leverage ratios & Asset 
turnover. 
Chen et al. (1985) 1983 Dairy  USA ROE, Leverage ratios 
Venieris (1989) 1985 Win Greece ROE, Leverage & Liquidity 
ratios 
Parliament et al.(1990)  1971-1987 Dairy  USA ROE, SR & Liquidity ratios 
Lerman & Parliament 
(1990) 
1976-1987 Fruits, vegetables & 
Dairy  
USA ROE, SR & Liquidity ratios 
Barton et al. (1993) 1991 Agricultural sectors  USA ROE, Asset turnover, & 
Leverage ratios 
Hind (1994) 1992 Several agricultural 
sectors  
UK Profitability, Current ratio, & 
Solvency ratio 
Harris & Fulton(1996) 1989-1993 Several agricultural 
sectors  
Canada Liquidity, profitability, 
productivity Growth  
Gentzoglanis (1997) 1986-1991 Dairy  Canada Profitability, Liquidity, 
Solvency& Leverage ratios 
Trechter et al. (1997) 1993-1994 Several agricultural 
sectors 
USA Profitability, Equity 
redemption, patronage refund 
Hardesty  & Salgia 
(2004) 
1991-2002 Several agricultural 
sectors  
USA Profitability, Liquidity, 
Solvency & Leverage ratios 
Barton (2004) 2002-2003 Several agricultural 
sectors  
USA Profitability, solvency, & 
equity structure ratios 
Notta & Vlachvei  
2007 
1990-2001 Dairy  Greece Profitability, Market share, 
Asset & Capital structure 
Brester & Boland(2004) 1996-2000 Sugar  USA Profitability & capital 
financing. 
McKee (2007) 2002-2006 Input supply & grain   USA Profitability, liquidity, & 
efficiency ratios 
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2.3.1 Empirical Studies Based on Financial and Other Economic Ratios   
There is no clear link between the financial ratios and economic theory. Financial ratios are 
often used, more or less intuitively, without sufficient consideration of their theoretical 
meaning and statistical properties. However, the financial ratios are necessary to handle the 
dynamic reality of the firm’s status and activities (Shubik, 1996). Financial ratios give a quick 
indication of the firm’s position in several dimensions (i.e., profitability, liquidity, solvency, 
efficiency, etc). They fail, however, to provide a unified and representative evaluation of the 
overall performance of the cooperative (Salmi and Martikainen, 1994).  
The financial ratios represent the relative value of a certain aspect of the firm to the 
value of another aspect of the same firm. For example, the distribution of the value of the 
firm’s profit over the value of its total equity gives the value of the return on equity. Equity 
may refer to a different aspect for the cooperative than it represents for the profit-maximizing 
firm (Zwanenberg et al., 1993). Therefore, a meaningful interpretation of the financial ratios 
requires understanding of what the values of each aspect of the ratio refers to for each 
cooperative.  
Researchers who have analyzed cooperative performance using the financial ratios 
differ in the ratios they consider when they analyze cooperative performance cooperative 
(Gentzoglanis, 1997). Financial ratios typically used in empirical studies of cooperative 
performance can be summarized in two main categories. The first category consists of ratios 
that show the ability and the efficiency of equity capital to generate returns, i.e., profitability 
and efficiency. In the second category are ratios that show the nature of financing this equity 
capital and the ability of the firm to pay its debts, i.e., capital financing (Gentzoglanis, 1997; 
Lerman and Parliament, 1990; Soboh, 2004)  
 
The Expected Value of Cooperative Financial Ratios 
The interpretation and the expectation of the financial ratio value depend on the authors’ 
objective and on the definition of each value (Gentzoglanis, 1997). However, some authors 
provide theoretical foundations for differences in the value of the cooperative’s ratios as 
compared to the investor-owned firms. These theoretical foundations are reasonably valid 
when viewing the cooperative as a vertically integrated firm in comparison to a profit-
maximizing independent firm.    
  The first category concentrates on profitability and efficiency of equity, assets and 
working capital to generate returns and sell products. Profitability ratios refer to the return to 
  25 
equity capital, assets and working capital. The return on equity is the most often used ratio 
indicating the profitability of the firm. Gentzoglanis (1997) argued that the cooperatives seek 
to provide members with the best possible price in addition to other services. Therefore, 
according to this view, cooperatives are expected to have a lower rate of return on equity than 
IOFs in the same industry. Efficiency ratios refer to the efficiency of equity capital, assets and 
working capital in terms of the production or sales size. Asset turnover, an example of an 
efficiency ratio, indicates the efficiency of the firm’s assets in terms of the total turnover. 
Lerman and Parliament (1990) argued that cooperatives are expected to have lower efficiency 
rates than IOFs in the same industry, because of the cooperative’s tendency to over-invest in 
fixed assets for the same sales.  
The second category, which contains leverage, solvency and liquidity ratios, 
concentrates on ratios that show the nature of financing equity capital and the ability of the 
firm to pay its debts. Leverage ratios refer to the amount of debt used to finance the firm’s 
capital and operations both in short- and long-term. Cooperatives have limited property rights 
and are considered ‘equity bound’ and therefore rely more on debt financing in order to 
finance growth than IOFs. Traditional cooperatives (i.e., viewed as a vertically integrated 
firm) by definition, can only raise equity capital from members. In addition, for reasons 
related to moral hazard concerns, cooperative managers perceive that their cooperative is 
more likely to merge with another cooperative in case of financial stress rather than face 
bankruptcy (Gentzoglanis, 1997). Therefore, cooperatives are expected to have a higher 
leverage ratio than IOFs.  
Solvency ratios refer to the ability of a firm to meet its long-term fixed expenses and 
debts and to accomplish long-term expansion and growth. An example of a solvency ratio is 
the ratio of equity to long-term liabilities (such as debt obligations to other parties for more 
than one year). Lerman and Parliament (1990) argued that given that cooperatives have the 
tendency to use more debt than IOFs, the expectation is that cooperative’s solvency is lower 
than the solvency of IOFs (assuming a traditional and vertically integrated firm). A low 
solvency level implies that the cooperatives would have a higher likelihood of default on debt 
service payments and higher prospects of bankruptcy than IOFs.  
Liquidity ratios refer to the ability of the firm to meet its short-term liabilities and to 
quickly convert an asset into cash. An example of a liquidity ratio is the current ratio, defined 
as current assets over current liabilities. For the same reasons as the solvency ratios, Lerman 
and Parliament (1990) argued that traditional and vertically integrated cooperatives are 
expected to have lower liquidity ratios than IOFs. 
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 Comparing Cooperatives with IOFs 
Schrader et al. (1985) examined the relative performance of the cooperatives versus IOFs 
using a cross-section of various agricultural sectors from 1979 to 1983. They found that 
cooperatives had a lower return on equity than IOFs, a lower leverage than their IOFs 
counterparts and no difference in the assets turnover.  
Chen et al. (1985) examined the relative performance of U.S. cooperatives to IOFs in 
the dairy industry using data from 1983. Their results confirm the theoretically expected 
performance of cooperatives relative to IOFs, i.e., they found that the profitability of 
cooperatives is lower relative to IOFs. Cooperatives also have a higher leverage than IOFs in 
the dairy industry.  
Venieris (1989) compared the performance of Greek wine cooperatives with the 
performance of IOFs. His results confirm the theoretically expected differences in 
profitability, leverage and liquidity, i.e., cooperatives showed lower profitability, higher 
leverage and higher liquidity than IOFs. However, according to Venieris, these results are due 
to the fact that cooperatives in Greece borrow capital at low interest rates from government 
agencies, while IOFs borrow at the market interest rate. 
 Lerman and Parliament (1990) studied the financial performance of the cooperatives 
and the IOFs of two sectors in the U.S.: the fruit and vegetables processing sector and the 
dairy sector over the years 1976-1987. Their results show that on average, the cooperatives 
and IOFs generated similar returns on equity and similar leverage results. In the dairy sector, 
cooperatives outperformed the IOFs on the rate of return on equity. In the fruit and vegetables 
sector, on the contrary, the cooperatives showed a lower rate of return on equity.  
Gentzoglanis (1997) examined the relative performance of Canadian dairy 
cooperatives to IOFs using data from six major dairy cooperatives and six IOFs from 1986 
through 1991. His results contradict the theoretically expected relationship, i.e., the 
cooperatives have a higher profitability, higher liquidity, and lower leverage than the IOFs.  
 Hardesty and Salgia (2004) compared the financial performance of cooperatives to 
IOFs using ratios for profitability, liquidity, leverage and asset efficiency in four U.S. sectors: 
− dairy, farm supplies, fruits and vegetables and grain. Cooperatives in all four sectors were 
less leveraged, but results indicated higher rates of asset efficiency for cooperatives only in 
the dairy sector. The results regarding the relative profitability and liquidity of cooperatives 
were not conclusive. 
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 Notta and Vlachvei (2007) tested whether significant profitability differences exist 
between cooperatives and IOFs in the Greek dairy sector. They used a net profit to total assets 
ratio for profitability, market share and several asset efficiency ratios over the period 1990 to 
2001. Their findings suggest that IOFs are more profitable than the cooperatives, which they 
explained as due to the IOFs’ effective capital structure and high market shares. 
 
 Inter-Cooperative Comparisons 
Lerman and Parliament (1989) examined the effect of size and sector on capital structure, 
efficiency, liquidity and profitability. They used data from a sample of 43 U.S. dairy supply, 
food marketing and processing and cotton and grain marketing cooperatives over the period 
1970–1987. Their results show that cooperatives with higher total assets have a higher asset 
turnover, but lower profitability and liquidity than cooperatives with lower total assets. As for 
the industry, dairy cooperatives were found to outperform cooperatives in the other two 
industries, but the authors suggest that this is due to government intervention in milk prices.  
 
 Other Ratios and Indicators 
A number of studies applied other ratios that are not commonly used in the accountancy 
literature to represent the cooperative’s performance.  
Ebneth and Theuvsen (2005) analyzed the performance of agricultural cooperatives in 
several industries in terms of their ability to enter the international markets. They used two 
index numbers that reflect the performance of the cooperative, i.e., the foreign sales index and 
the network spread index. The foreign sales index is defined as the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales. The network spread index is defined as a ratio of the number of countries in which 
a company owns subsidiaries to the maximum number of countries in which a company could 
have subsidiaries. Their results showed that cooperatives in small countries with a 
comparative small domestic market, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, have higher 
values for both ratios than cooperatives from large countries, such as Germany and France. 
Ebneth and Theuvsen explained that companies in small countries are forced to 
internationalize to become cost-efficient.  
Ling and Liebrand (1998) introduced an index that reflects the operational efficiency 
of the cooperative that they termed as “Extra Value Index”, defined as the difference between 
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the net operating margin and the interest on equity2. They used this index in addition to the 
rate of return on equity to investigate the performance of dairy cooperatives and compare it 
with the performance of dairy IOFs. Their study was based on the 25 largest dairy 
cooperatives and 15 largest IOFs in the U.S. dairy sector between 1986 and 1996. Their 
results indicate that dairy cooperatives did just as well create value for its members as the IOF 
created for its shareholders, while dairy cooperatives realized lower rates of return on equity 
than did the IOFs. In another study Ling implemented the Extra Value Index, developed by 
himself and Liebrand in 1998, with different values of the interest rate to evaluate the ability 
of the 21 largest U.S. dairy cooperatives across two time periods: 1992 through 1996 and 
2000 through 2004.  
 
2.3.2 Empirical Studies Based on Economical Efficiency Techniques 
Authors of the empirical studies in this category view the cooperative as an independent 
profit-maximizing firm. They utilize different tools such as Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). These studies basically use quantitative tools 
to explain the value of one output using the value of many different inputs.  
 
Comparing Cooperatives to IOFs 
Cooperatives, as perceived by Alchian and Demsetez (1972), Furubotn (1976) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1979) are inferior organizations due to monitoring, horizon, common property, 
non-transferability and control problems. Porter and Scully (1987), Ferrier and Porter (1991), 
and Oustapassidis et al. (1998) claimed that the cooperative is less technically efficient 
mainly due to the higher cost to control their many principles. Moreover, they argue that 
cooperatives are less able to allocate efficiently due to the horizon problem (i.e., the lack of 
the property right that allows the member to sell his ownership share upon leaving the 
cooperative). This can cause the cooperative to underutilize capital. Cooperatives can also be 
scale inefficient due to the rapidly increasing cost to control large numbers of members, 
                                                 
2
 Extra value= net operation margin (before tax) – interest on equity, where: 
Net operation margin(before tax) = operating margin + interest income - interest expenses + other income – other expenses, and 
interest on equity = (member or stockholder equity – investment in other firms) * interest rate (Ling and Liebrand, 1998) 
 
 
 
  29 
which prevents them from achieving a scale efficient operation (Mosheim, 2002). On the 
contrary, some other researchers view the cooperatives as advantageous due to their goal 
alignment with members giving the cooperative an informational advantage in case altruism is 
present (Bontems and Fulton, 2005). Also, due to lower agency rents, cooperatives have an 
operational advantage in the lower return economical conditions (Hueth and Marcoul, 2007). 
In the following paragraphs we present the major findings of the different empirical literature. 
Porter and Scully (1987) utilized a Stochastic Production Frontier approach to evaluate 
the relative performance of cooperatives versus IOFs using 1972 data for a sample of U.S. 
milk processing plants. They conclude that dairy cooperatives were on average only 75.5% as 
efficient as their IOF counterparts and that the cooperatives could raise output by 32.4% 
without requiring extra inputs. According to Porter and Scully, this inefficiency is attributed 
to problems related with the cooperative’s property rights, specifically the horizon problem, 
the free rider problem and the portfolio problem as summarized in later work by Cook (1995).  
Akridge and Hertel (1992) estimated cost differences between grain and farm supply 
cooperatives and IOFs using a generalized Translog multi-product cost function. They 
concluded that IOFs were more cost efficient than the cooperatives in this industry. Sexton et 
al. (1989) tested the allocation efficiency of cotton ginning cooperatives and the hypothesis 
that cooperatives are not using their total capital efficiently. Their results reject the argument 
that cooperatives tend to underutilize capital.  
Singh et al. (2001) applied DEA and SFA to compare the performance of the dairy 
cooperatives to the private sector in India. They used data collected over four years from 13 
dairy cooperatives and 10 IOFs in two different Indian states. They concluded that 
cooperatives are more cost efficient than IOFs.  
Doucouliagos and Hone (2000) used DEA and SFA to assess the technical efficiency 
of Australian dairy processing firms using data over the period 1969-1996. Their results show 
a modest technical progress and indicate some convergence in productivity levels across 
regions. They conclude that the Australian dairy sector is operating at a high level of technical 
efficiency.  
Boyle (2004) investigated the economic efficiency of Irish dairy cooperatives over the 
period 1961-1987. He argued that cooperatives are not efficient for two reasons: (a) 
cooperatives suffer from technical inefficiency because of principal-agent problems and 
allocation inefficiency due to horizon problems; (b) cooperatives prices for raw milk are 
inefficient. Boyle’s results suggest that cooperatives price their inputs just as IOFs. 
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For other empirical literature dealing with the efficiency of cooperatives in relation to 
other organizational types, see for example Ferrantino et al. (1995), Dong and Putterman 
(1997) and Zhang et al. (2001)  
 
Inter-Cooperative Comparisons 
Ariyarantne et al. (2000) studied three efficiency measurements (technical efficiency, 
allocation efficiency and sales efficiency) for 89 U.S. grain marketing and farm supply 
cooperatives over the period 1988-1992. They conclude that cooperatives could improve 
efficiency by increasing their scale, but the potential gains were relatively small. Large 
cooperatives are generally more efficient than smaller ones and cooperatives with a 
diversified output mix are more technically efficient and more efficient overall compared to 
specialized cooperatives. 
 Sueyoshi et al. (1998) used Data Envelopment Analysis for a bilateral performance 
comparison of Japanese agricultural cooperatives on the basis of cross-sectional data in 1998. 
They used three index numbers (comparative production index, comparative cost index, and 
comparative cost reduction ratio) as the DEA measures for the bilateral performance 
comparisons. They conclude that the size of the cooperative does not affect efficiency.  
Hailu et al. (2005) examined the productive efficiency of 54 Canadian fruit and 
vegetable cooperatives over the period 1984-2001. They conclude that the production costs 
for these cooperatives could have been reduced by 28% if they had only operated at their 
production frontiers. They also note that financial leverage had a negative effect on cost 
efficiency and possibly caused a negative financial pressure on the performance of the 
cooperatives.  
 
2.4 Discussion 
 
In reviewing the theoretical literature we explore the plethora of optimizing behavior that may 
emerge according to different theoretical views. Generally speaking, the empirical approaches 
view the cooperative as an independent firm that does not explicitly address members’ 
objectives. Addressing members’ objectives in performance measurement can be achieved by 
using multiple-objectives methodologies, e.g., multi-criteria analysis. This methodology was 
used in evaluating the performance of a single dairy cooperative (Soboh, 2006). Members’ 
objectives were related to price payment, the cooperative’s long-term perspective of growth 
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and profitability with the lowest price (equity-funding) possible (Zwanenberg et al., 1993) A 
high equity growth rate is an indicator of either an increase in the member’s contribution (in 
cases where members are the only shareholders) or an increase in equity from non-members 
who aim to maximize the return on their investment (in cases where non-members can invest 
in the cooperative). Soboh (2004) implemented a growth-rate indicator to reflect the long-
term performance of a few large European agricultural cooperatives. 
 On the other hand, empirical evidence of cooperative performance using the 
frameworks of vertical integration and coalition of firms is impossible due to lack of data. 
Authors who view the cooperative as a form of vertical integration suggest that maximizing 
the benefits of the members is the cooperative’s objective. Among these authors are Sexton 
and Iskow (1988), who suggested that evaluating the vertical integration model requires long-
term information related to members’ economical well-being and cooperative growth 
perspectives. Empirical application requires data that represents the economical well being of 
members before and after forming (or joining) the cooperative and the economical well being 
of the farmers who are not part of the cooperative. In addition, empirical applications require 
data that represent the growth perspectives of the cooperative in comparison to the IOF 
growth perspectives and the benefits for dairy farmers vertically integrated in a cooperative.   
 
2.5 Conclusions  
 
The review of the theoretical and empirical economic literature on the performance of AM 
cooperatives provides insight into the match between the conceptual frameworks and the 
empirical applications. AM cooperatives differ widely both in constitution and in their 
aspirations and vary considerably from investor-owned firms. AM cooperatives have 
developed from purely traditional to different organizational forms such as new generation 
cooperatives and partnerships between investor-owned and cooperative firms. The variation, 
the development and the lack of a clear definition of the cooperative firm promote three 
different views of the cooperative that are analyzed by assuming either single or multiple 
cooperative objective(s). In the literature we observe that authors usually start from a single-
objective cooperative view and also assume that members are homogenous in their 
characteristics, objectives and cost structures. Within the literature that assumes a single 
objective, two views of cooperatives exist: one as a vertically integrated firm and another as 
an independent firm (or a variant of it). On the other hand, the literature that suggests multiple 
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cooperative objectives assumes heterogeneous stakeholders (such as new members, inactive 
members, investors, suppliers, and management board) with different characteristics, 
objectives and cost structure. Viewing the cooperative as a coalition of firms assumes 
multiple objectives for the cooperatives.  
Presently, there are few matches between the theoretical analyses and empirical 
evidence on cooperative objectives and performance. Although theoretical contributions on 
the performance of cooperatives recognize the differences between the economic behavior of 
cooperatives and IOFs, empirical studies mostly focus on evaluating cooperative performance 
as if the cooperative were an IOF, albeit with different types of shareholders. Evaluating the 
performance of cooperatives as vertically integrated firms or as coalitions has virtually been 
ignored as a subject for empirical analysis. This seems to be due to either the inaccessibility of 
data, the inability to take into account the interests of all the various types of members and 
stakeholders of the cooperative or the difficulty in testing the various hypotheses in practice. 
In particular, the difficulty of aggregating the objectives of the heterogeneous stakeholders of 
the cooperative can hardly be overstated. However, it is fair to say from our review of the 
empirical studies that empirical economists have focused more on regarding the cooperative 
as an independent firm, while ignoring (intentionally or not) the other views of the 
economical behavior of the cooperatives. 
Financial ratios have been used in many empirical studies to compare the performance 
of the cooperative with the performance of the IOF in the same industry. These studies, 
however, fail to address the difference in financing the cooperative’s capital and the financial 
viewpoint of the owners of the cooperative, i.e., the members.  
 Few studies have used mathematical and statistical tools in evaluating the (micro) 
economic efficiency. These techniques, although based on economic theory, view the 
cooperative as an independent firm with a single objective, i.e., to maximize its profit. These 
studies fail to address the nature of the cooperative as an organization with a specific 
characteristic, that of being a firm that is user-owned, user-controlled and user-benefited.  
 Considering the performance of the cooperative in isolation would be meaningless, 
since cooperatives represent a firm with a dependent nature. Thus the appraisal of 
performance has to take into account the objectives of the cooperatives’ owner-patrons, as 
well as the marketing and processing of the cooperative’s product in the supply chain. 
Cooperatives are firms with a dual purpose or two-layer entrepreneurship that have to cope 
with both the competitive market environment and have to fulfill the objectives of the 
member firms. Empirical studies of cooperative performance have failed so far to address the 
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specific structure and conduct of the cooperative from that point of view: as an organization 
that needs to fulfill the objectives of its members. Members’ return and continuity should be 
viewed as at the core of the objectives of the cooperative. Therefore, a meaningful empirical 
evaluation of the cooperative’s performance should address the dual objective nature of the 
organization. 
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Abstract 
 
 
The European dairy industry is facing a number of challenges related to policy changes and 
global trends that add pressure on their economic performance. This study uses logistic 
regression to analyze differences in financial and performance indicators between European 
dairy cooperatives and investor-owned firms. The investigated indicators are profitability, 
debt, operational efficiency, equity growth, size and country dummies. The empirical 
application uses data from 170 European dairy firms. Cooperatives are on average less 
profitable, operate more efficiently and have a stronger financial position than investor- 
owned firms. Using the above mentioned financial and performance indicators, cooperatives 
appear to be well equipped to cope with the challenges ahead. 
 
 
 
Key words: Dairy Cooperatives, Financial Performance, Logistic Regression.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The European dairy sector is facing challenges related to policy changes, demand and price 
volatility in global markets, introduction of new regulations, changes of consumers’ 
preferences and increasing demand for animal feed by bio-fuel sector. First, the European 
Union aims to transform the dairy sector towards a competitive and market-oriented sector 
(Boel, 2007), starting with the CAP reforms and the gradual lifting of the quota system until 
its anticipated ending in 2015. The CAP reforms (or “health check” as Boel calls them) 
resulted in a lower budgetary support for the production of bulk dairy products (milk powder 
and butter). The EU-commission claims that the reform, which started in 2003, has introduced 
strong incentives towards market orientation, which makes the classical market management 
tools (export refunds and interventions) less relevant and less defendable in WTO discussions 
(Boel, 2008). The gradual lifting of the quota system requires the EU policy makers to search 
for transitional measures to ensure that the abolition of the quota system ends in a soft 
landing. Ending the quota system provides opportunities to dairy farmers who are able to 
produce more than their quota, while adding more difficulties on farmers in the less favored 
areas and who are not able to produce above their quota (Boel, 2007). Second, the global 
dairy market is increasingly volatile. In 2007 the demand for dairy products is being stretched 
by reduction in milk output from major exporters such as Australia and South America, along 
with increasing demand from major European markets such as Germany and Italy and 
emerging markets such as China, India and Russia (Kleibeuker, 2007). Third, the dairy sector 
faces the introduction of new regulations related to nutritional claims and environmental 
requirements. Dairy producers will need to ensure that they are meeting these new legal 
requirements (Picazo-Tadeoa and Reig-Martíneza, 2007, Merrett, 2007). Fourth, consumers’ 
preferences are changing towards more value-added dairy products with high nutritious 
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claims and a longer shelf life (Devlieghere et al., 2004). Fifth, the dairy sector faces an 
increasing demand for bio-fuel that largely uses the same plants which dairy farmers need for 
feeding their cattle (Hill et al., 2006). In 2005, the EU produced 80% of the total bio-diesel 
production in the world, which is promoted by direct and indirect subsidies. Brussels aims to 
have 5.75 percent of the motor fuel consumed in the EU to come from biofuels by 2010 and 
10 percent by 2020 (Runge and Senauer, 2007). As a result feed costs have increased and are 
projected to continue to increase.  
Dairy farmers in Europe are left to operate in a more competitive market with more 
volatile returns and increasing costs. More volatile returns are partly due to the growth of 
global demand and partly due to the latest EU policy changes, such as the reduction of export 
refunds and interventions. EU milk prices have been particularly volatile in the past two 
years, i.e., in the period between February 2007 and February 2008 prices increased by more 
than 33 percent (LTO, 2008). Concerns are now raised about the sustainability of the growth 
in milk prices and the impact of the price volatility on the development of the dairy industry 
(Merrett, 2008). Increasing costs are due to the recent health and environmental requirements, 
responding to the consumers changing preferences and the growing prices of animal feed. In 
this more competitive and volatile environment, European dairy farmers need partners in the 
dairy processing industry that have a sound performance, serve their objectives efficiently and 
help the farmers in easing their financial stress. Farmers generally have their raw milk 
processed by dairy processing firms with ownership structure of either a cooperative or an 
investor-owned firm , where the latter is dominated by stock-listed and family owned firms. 
The challenges facing the European dairy sector also have financial implications for 
the dairy processing industry. This industry operates increasingly in transparent markets in 
which information about the performance and goodwill spreads globally and quickly (Lin, 
2006). These factors, although strengthening the competitive market conditions, raise 
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concerns about the rationality behind the existence of the cooperative as a distinguished type 
of firm (Cross and Buccola, 2004). Additionally, these challenges have different implications 
for cooperatives rather than for IOFs. For instance, as a consequence of quota removal, milk 
production will no longer be frozen within certain national/regional boundaries. This has very 
different implications for cooperatives rather than for IOFs, as the first will try to remain 
locally rooted, while the second will be more prepared to source wherever the milk is 
cheapest, provided the distance from consumer markets is not prohibitive (Van Bekkum, 
2001). Van Bekkum (2001) also highlighted that the implications of these challenges are 
different depending on the strategy of the firm, such as focusing on bulk or on high value 
added production.  
To successfully deal with the challenges described above requires an active search for 
new investments in product development and acquisition in new markets. Coping with these 
challenges requires an efficient performance and a strong capital position to finance the new 
investments.  
An empirical analysis of the performance and financial characteristics of dairy 
cooperatives versus IOFs will provide insight into the sustainability of the cooperative dairy 
firms in the more competitive market environment.  
The average difference of the financial performance between the dairy cooperatives 
and IOFs has been widely studied in literature (see e.g. See Schrader, 1985; Chen et al. 1985; 
Lerman and Parliament, 1989 &1990; Parliament et al., 1990; Gentzoglanis, 1997). These 
studies generally assumed cooperatives and IOFs to have identical, objective functions, which 
led to erroneous or at least incomplete conclusions (Van Dijk and Klep, 2005). However, a 
comparison of mean values generally yields inaccurate insights into distinguishable 
characteristics between cooperatives and IOFs; a multivariate analysis can address this. 
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Furthermore it is noted that none of these studies provided a comparison for the European 
dairy industry. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an empirical classification based on a 
multivariate analysis and to study the distinguishing financial aspects of European dairy 
processing cooperatives from IOFs. The classification aims to differentiate the two types of 
firms in terms of their financial ratios and other factors reflecting the difference in the 
orientation of cooperatives (as members’ profit oriented firms) and IOFs (as share holder 
value oriented firms). The empirical classification provides insight into differences in 
financial ratios and other factors between IOFs and cooperatives in the European sector of the 
dairy processing firms. The distinguishing financial aspects indicate the financial ability and 
flexibility of these two different types of firms to cope with the future challenges faced by the 
dairy industry.      
 
 3.2 Theoretical Background 
 
Cooperatives differ in their essence, objectives and their sources of capital from IOFs. They 
are essentially formed by their members to have a countervailing power, to gain access to 
industrially produced goods and services, to gain access to markets for their products, to use 
the efficiency of economies of scale, to manage their risk and to improve their own income 
(Van Dijk, 1997). Therefore, cooperatives, which are owned, controlled and aimed to benefit 
their members, have different objectives than IOFs which are typically characterized as 
shareholder-value oriented firms, i.e. as profit maximizers. Cooperatives aim to provide 
services to their members and distribute the surplus according to patronage; IOFs aim to 
maximize the return to investment and distribute the surplus according to the investment 
(Helmberger and Hoos, 1962; Lerman and Parliament, 1990). With a few exceptions, 
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cooperatives in the EU are not traded publicly in stock markets. The principal sources of 
finance for the cooperative’s capital are mainly the members (farmers) retained equity (Van 
Dijk and Klep, 2005). IOFs differ fundamentally in their sources of capital; IOFs are publicly 
traded and have non-farmer shareholders (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). The differences in 
objectives and sources of capital between the two types of firms implies that the performance 
of the cooperatives vis-à-vis IOFs differs in terms of profitability, capital financing and 
operational efficiency (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002).  
With respect to profitability, cooperatives are not considered to be maximizers of 
return on capital investments (Lerman and Parliament, 1990; Van Dijk, 1997). The owners of 
cooperatives, contrary to the owners of IOFs, are not mainly interested in the return on their 
investment but in other services and benefits provided by the cooperatives, such as a high 
milk price and a secure market outlet (Staatz, 1989).  Consequently, cooperatives are expected 
to have a lower profitability and higher material cost (including raw milk) than IOFs (Lerman 
and Parliament, 1990).  
With respect to capital financing, cooperatives are usually viewed as equity-bound 
firms, suggesting that members’ equity, in principle, is the only source of capital financing. 
Therefore, cooperatives may need to rely more on debt financing than IOFs in order to 
finance their activities and sustain comparable growth rate (Lerman and Parliament, 1990). 
An additional factor is the attitude towards risk. Gentzoglanis (1997) argued that the 
cooperative’s principle of risk sharing and mutual responsibility may provide an incentive to 
decision-makers of cooperatives to accept higher levels of risk rather than what the managers 
of IOFs would accept. Copeland and Weston (1988 ) argued that cooperatives have a higher 
level of debt because of the risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, cooperatives are expected to have a  
higher debt than IOFs and to have lower safety margins against the risk of defaulting on debt 
service and current liabilities. 
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With respect to operational efficiency, as measured by utilization of assets to generate 
revenue, Lerman and Parliament (1990) argued that cooperatives have the tendency to over-
invest to form a greater asset base than the asset base of IOFs. This is because cooperatives 
may treat own cooperative’s equity as costless funds, without acknowledging their 
opportunity cost. Undervaluing the cost of equity may lead to over-investments, resulting in a 
lower utilization of assets by cooperatives rather than IOFs. These aspects suggest that 
cooperatives have higher yearly equity growth than IOFs. However, the over-investment 
needs not only be in fixed assets; it can also affect current assets, resulting in a higher level of 
inventories (Lerman and Parliament, 1990). 
The major source of equity funding for cooperatives is retained patronage. The 
cooperative’s retained patronage is either allocated or unallocated. The allocated type of 
patronage is assigned to the individual member and is to be redeemed to this member 
sometimes in the future. The unallocated type is not assigned to a specific member-account 
and therefore is only paid back to members when the cooperative dissolves (Cropp et al., 
1998). Cooperatives have slow and different redemption systems of the allocated equity 
(Kenkel, 2005).  
European dairy cooperatives are generally not publicly traded, nor are they open for 
non-members’ investment. The nature of the allocated and unallocated equity, in addition to 
the slow redemption process, leads to the conclusion that cooperatives have a higher growth 
in their general reserves and other non-issued equity base (Zwanenberg et al., 1993). 
However, the size of the general reserves and other non-issued equity base depends on the 
firm’s size. Evans (1987) found that the firm’s size of equity growth decreases at a 
diminishing rate with the firm’s size represented in the firm’s total assets. The fact that the 
firm is publicly traded makes no difference for the relation between its equity growth and its 
size (Evans, 1987).  
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The cooperatives’ financial characteristics may substantially differ across countries. 
Zwanenberg et al. (1993)  argued that the cooperatives in the Netherlands and Belgium 
determine profitability in a similar way, but different from the way it is determined by 
cooperatives in France, Germany and Ireland. The total milk payment in the Netherlands and 
Belgium depends on the performance of the cooperative, while in France, Germany and 
Ireland the total milk payment is independent of the cooperatives performance (Zwanenberg 
et al., 1993).  Moreover, in Ireland cooperatives are public limited companies in which some 
proportion of the cooperative’s shares is publicly traded (Harte, 1997).  These two arguments 
suggest that the differences in financial and other ratios between cooperatives and IOFs may 
be country-specific. 
Dairy processing firms substantially differ in terms of their size. These size differences 
may affect the extent to which the variables described above distinguish cooperatives from 
IOFs. More specifically, dairy processing cooperatives are expected to have a larger size than 
IOFs. This is because IOFs choose the size that optimize the return to investment, whereas the 
size of dairy cooperatives is determined by the quantity of milk delivered by its members. 
 
3.3 Empirical Model  
 
The empirical model aims to study if the dairy firm’s financial characteristics can determine 
whether this firm is an IOF or cooperative. The firm’s financial characteristics, which are 
highlighted by the literature, are related to profitability, capital financing, operational 
efficiency, equity growth and firm size.   
 
 
3.3.1 Indicators 
  49 
Profitability is represented by two indicators: the ratio of profit before taxes to total asset 
(PTA) and the ratio of material cost to total assets (MC). Profit after taxes of the firm reflects 
the firm’s objective to maximize profit. Several indicators of profitability are available in the 
data set; i.e. profit before taxes, profit after interests and taxes, and cash flow. Profit before 
taxes (PTA) was selected, because this variable had the smallest number of missing values in 
the available data set used for estimation. The costs of materials reflect the firm’s payment for 
the milk delivered by the farmers (or members in case of cooperatives). The MC was the only 
indicator to include the milk payment; however, MC includes also the costs of other materials 
used in processing the dairy product.      
Capital financing is represented by three indicators: total debt to total assets (DTA), long 
term debt to equity (DR) and current assets to current debt (CR). Total debt to total assets 
reflects the dependence of the firm on debt financing; long-term debt to equity reflects the 
ability of the firm to meet its long-term obligations, while current assets to current debt 
reflects the ability of the firm to meet its current obligations. 
Operational efficiency is represented by two indicators: turnover to fixed assets (FT) and 
turnover to inventories (IT). Turnover to fixed assets reflects the efficiency of the firm’s fixed 
assets in producing its total turnover, while turnover to inventories reflects the proportional 
size of the inventories to the total assets. 
The yearly growth of non issued equity (EG) reflects the rate of change of the size of the non 
issued equity such as general reserves between two successive years.  
Firm size is reflected by the value of total assets (TA). 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Methodology 
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 Logistic Regression  
This study uses logistic regression as a descriptive tool to investigate whether cooperatives are 
empirically different from IOFs in their financial ratios and a number of other factors. Using 
the logistic regression allows us to investigate the hypothesis that the cooperatives’ financial 
characteristics are statistically different from the ones of the IOFs.  Logistic regression is a 
similar method as discriminant analysis (Press and Wilson, 1978), but maintains less 
restrictive assumptions than discriminant analysis (Efron, 1975). Unlike discriminant analysis, 
logistic regression does not require the independent variables to be normally distributed and to 
have equal variance within each group. Logistic regression was used in many studies in 
different fields as a descriptive tool to empirically discriminate or investigate differences 
between two categories as represented by the dependant variable (see e.g. Pearce and Ferrier 
(2000); Morgan et al. (2003); Timmerman et al.(2005); Khan et al. (2006)).      
 The dichotomous dependent variable in our study represents the type of dairy 
processing firm, i.e., IOF or cooperative. Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood 
after transforming the dependent into a logit variable (i.e., the natural logarithm of the odds of 
the observation being a cooperative or an IOF) to estimate the changes in the log odds of the 
dependent variable. The relationship describing the impact of the independent variables on the 
log of the odds of being a cooperative is assumed to be linear (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
 
 Model Specification 
The logit-transformation of the likelihood of being cooperative (θ) has a linear relationship 
with several independent variables. This relationship is specified as: 
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 Land is a dummy variable indicating the country of the processing firm. All α, β, and γ are 
parameters to be estimated. 
The interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward. While β is convenient for 
testing the significance of predictors, the exponential value of the βs is easier to interpret. The 
exponential value of the (β) represents the ratio-change in the odds of being a coop for a one-
unit change in the predictor, i.e., the odds-ratio. Note that an odds ratio above 1 reflects a 
positive odds that the dependent = 1, i.e., that the observation represents a cooperative. An 
odds value close to unity suggests the independent variable does not distinguish cooperatives 
from IOFs. 
 
    Bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping is a general approach to obtaining statistical inference on a sampling 
distribution for a parameter by re-sampling from the data at hand. The term ‘bootstrapping’, 
due to Efron (1979), is an allusion to the expression ‘pulling oneself up by one’s bootstraps’ – 
in this case, the sample data as a population from which repeated samples are drawn (Fox, 
2002). There are many advantages of using the bootstrapping technique. It allows us to take 
into account more of the data variability while using the logistic regression, i.e., bootstrapping 
allows the variability of the indicators in the selected sample to mimic their variability in the 
total population (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). This is useful to correct for any possible sample 
bias and strengthen the validity of the estimators. In this study we drew 100 repeated samples 
and estimated the bootstrapped results based on 90 percent of the total observations. About 90 
percent of the total observations were drawn randomly from the sample of IOFs and 
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cooperatives separately using a Bernoulli random selection procedure with probability 
parameter of 0.9. The 10 percent of the total sample, which was not used in the estimation, 
was used to validate the estimation results.  
 
3.4 Data  
 
The data used in this study are accounting data of dairy processing firms from the 
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France and Ireland. The data were obtained from 
AMADEUS, which is a comprehensive, pan-European database containing financial 
information on over 10 million public and private companies in 38 European countries. It 
combines data from over 30 specialist regional information providers, i.e., chambers of 
commerce. To address the accounting differences across the different countries, AMADEUS 
provides standardized definitions of the different financial ratios. In this study, we used 
unbalanced panel data over the period 1996-2004 of 170 dairy processing firms (of which 
27% are cooperatives). Of the 1226 observations, 136 observations are with missing variables, 
leaving us with 1090 complete observations. Several indicators were selected to represent 
profitability (PTA and MC), capital financing (DTA, DR, and CR), operational efficiency (FT 
and IT) and equity growth (EG). Other variables in the model are dummy variables to 
represent the country of origin and total assets (TA) to represent the impact of firm size. Table 
3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the logistic regression model.  
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dairy Processing Firms 1996-2004 
Mean (Std. Dev.) Variable 
(Denotation) 
Definition Theoretical 
Expectation All IOF Coop 
Difference 
Sign. level 
 
Profitability  
 
 
 
    
Profit (PTA) profit before interest 
and taxes/total assets 
IOF > COOP 
 
0.049 
(0.15) 
0.053 
(0.09) 
0.040 
(0.24) 0.13 
Material cost 
(MC) 
material cost/total asset IOF < COOP 0.220 
(0.62) 
0.180 
(0.39) 
0.323 
(0.98) 0.00 
Capital 
financing  
  
    
Total Debt 
(DTA) 
total debt /total asset IOF < COOP* 
 
0.689 
(0.18) 
0.705 
(0.19) 
0.652 
(0.17) 0.00 
Debt ratio (DR) long term debt/total 
equity 
IOF < COOP 
 
1.04 
(4.0) 
0.99 
(3.33) 
1.16 
(5.24) 0.54 
Current ratio 
(CR) 
current assets/current 
liabilities 
IOF > COOP 1.50 
(0.95) 
1.32 
(0.9) 
1.94 
(1.06) 0.00 
Operational 
efficiency 
 
  
    
Fixed Asset 
Turnover (FT) 
turnover/fixed assets IOF > COOP* 87.6 
(1151) 
14.7 
(66.46) 
263.6 
(2121.3) 
 
0.00 
Stock turnover 
(IT)  
turnover/ inventories IOF > COOP* 
 
41.3 
(21.3) 
37.2 
(22.19) 
43.1 
(18.21) 0.00 
 
Equity growth 
      
Growth Ratio 
(GR) 
[NI-Equity (y+1) – NI-
Equity (y)]/NI-Equity 
y)1 
IOF < COOP* 1.12 
(2.92) 
1.27 
(2.10) 
0.75 
(4.28) 
0.475 
Size factor       
Total assets  
(TA) 
(100000x) 
  0.992 
(151) 
0.578 
(11.22) 
1.94   
(274.7) 
 
0.00 
* Results contradicted the theoretical expectation. 
 
 
3.5 Results and Discussion    
 
3.5.1 Model Estimation  
Maximum likelihood estimation was used to estimate how likely the odds of the observed 
values of the dependent (being an IOF or a cooperative) may be predicted from the observed 
values of the independents. Table 3.2 provides the results of the bootstrapped estimation while 
Table 3.3 provides the percentage of the correctly classified firms. Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit statistic (Pseudo R2) yields an average p-value of 0.1877, which is higher than 
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the benchmark for the model as being model fit, Pseudo R2 > 0.05. This indicates that the 
model fits the data used in the estimation (90% of the total observations).  
Profitability 
For the profitability indicators, the odds-ratio of profit before interest and taxes to total assets 
(PTA) was less than one (0,00) and significant at the critical 5% level, while the odds-ratio of 
material cost to total assets (MC) was greater than one (1,368) and significant.  
The odds-ratio of the PTA coefficient suggests that, ceteris paribus, an increase of the 
PTA value by 1 unit increases the estimated odds that the firm is a cooperative by 0.000, this 
suggest that a dairy processing firm with the high profit ratio is properly not a cooperative.  
The odds-ratio of the MC coefficient reflects that, ceteris paribus, an increase of the 
MC value by 1 unit increases the estimated odds that the firm is a cooperative by 1.368. This 
suggests that a dairy processing firm with high material costs is more likely to be a 
cooperative. The results for profitability and material costs are consistent with their theoretical 
expectations. 
Capital Structure 
For the capital financing indicators, the odds-ratio of the total debt to total assets (DTA) was 
less than one (0.025) and significant, while both the long-term debt to total equity (DR) and 
the current ratio (CR) were greater than one, i.e, (1,029) and (1,005), and insignificant. The 
odds-ratio of the DTA coefficient suggests that, ceteris paribus, an increase of the DTA value 
by 1 unit increases the estimated odds that the firm is a cooperative by 0.025. This suggests 
that a dairy processing firm with high total debt ratio is probably not a cooperative. The result 
for DTA is not in line with the a priori theoretical expectation.  
  Operational Efficiency  
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Among the operational efficiency indicators, the odds-ratio of the turnover to fixed assets 
(FT) was greater than one (1,012) and significant, while the odds-ratio of turnover to 
inventories (IT) was  less than one (0,988) and significant. 
 The odds-ratio of FT suggests that, ceteris paribus, an increase of the FT value by 1 
unit increases the estimated odds that the firm is a cooperative by 1.012, i.e., a dairy 
processing firm with high turnover to fixed asset is more likely to be a cooperative. The odds-
ratio of the IT suggests that, ceteris paribus, an increase of the IT value by 1 unit increases the 
estimated odds that the firm is a cooperative by 0.988, i.e. a dairy processing firm with high 
turnover to inventories is probably not a cooperative. The result for FT is inconsistent with its 
theoretical expectation whereas the result for IT is in line with its a priori theoretical 
expectation. 
Growth Ratio 
The growth rate of the non-issued equity (EG) was less than one (0.988) but insignificant. The 
odds-ratio of EG reflects that, given that the value of every other indicator is fixed, an 
increase of the EG value by one unit increases the estimated odds that the firm is a 
cooperative by 0.988.  This suggests that a dairy processing firm with a high growth ratio is 
more likely not a cooperative. This result is inconsistent with the theoretical expectation.  
 Country 
The four dummies of German, Belgium, France and Ireland are all greater than one, i.e., 
(1.17), (2.07), (2.83), (3.42) respectively, but are insignificant at the critical 5% level. These 
insignificant results indicate that the differences between countries (in terms of taxes and 
accounting rules or any other influential factor) are not significantly influential in classifying 
the firms into cooperative or IOF.   
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  Size  
The odds-ratio of firm size, as represented by total assets (TA) was greater than one and 
significant. The odds-ratio of the TA suggests that, ceteris paribus, an increase of the TA by 1 
unit increases the estimated odds that the firm is a cooperative by 1.294, i.e. cooperatives 
ceteris paribus have a larger size than IOFs. This result confirms the a priori theoretical 
expectation that cooperatives attain a larger size than IOFs. This result follows from the fact 
that cooperatives are less flexible in determining the optimal firm size than IOFs, i.e., 
cooperatives have to process the volume of milk delivered by their members. 
This study also investigated the hypothesis that firm size affects the extent to which the 
financial variables distinguish cooperatives from IOFs. In order to do so, the data was 
separated into two subsets, a subset of firms smaller and a subset of firms larger than average 
sizes. The model in (1) was estimated for each subset and a likelihood ratio test was 
performed to test whether the parameters are significantly different between the model of all 
the samples and the two separated data groups (i.e., small and large firms).  The hypothesis 
was rejected at the 5% critical level implying that firm size does affect the relationship 
between financial variables and firm type. This finding leads us to continue with the results of 
our model as presented in Table 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  57 
Table 3.2: The Average of the Estimations of the Logistic Model 
Variable (Denotation)  Odds-ratio [exp(α; β)] 
[Effectiveness]{ if ≈ 1→ no effect } 
p-Value  
[Significance] 
Constant (α) 145 0.000 
Profitability    
 Profit ratio (PTA) 0.000  0.000 
Material cost ratio(MC)   1.368 0.053 
 Capital financing   
Total debt ratio (DTA) 0.025 0.000 
Long term debt ratio (DR) 1.029 0.629 
Current ratio (CR) 1.005 0.947 
Growth   
Growth Ratio 0.988 0.332 
Operational efficiency   
Turnover to fixed assets (FT) 1.012 0.000 
Turnover to inventories (IT) 0.988 0.003 
Size factor   
Total Assets (TA)/100000 1.294 0.000 
Country   
Germany 1.166 0.752 
Belgium 2.067 0.649 
France 2.833 0.137 
Ireland 3.417 0.137 
Pseudo R2 (Hosmer and Lemeshow test) = 0.1877.  
 
3.5.2 Validating the Results 
 
The previous results (presented in Table 3.2) show the results of classifying the dairy 
processing firms using financial and performance characteristics. In this section we 
investigate the ability of the logistic model to correctly classify the firms used in the 
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bootstrapped estimation (90% of the total observation) and to validate with the firms which 
were not used in the estimation (the remaining observations).  
 
Table 3.3: Classification and Validation Results 
Observed Predicted 
 Selected cases Unselected cases1 Total 
 IOF Cooperative Percentage 
correct 
IOF Cooperative Percentage 
correct 
Percentage 
correct 
IOF 718 40 94.7 84 9 90.3 94.3 
Cooperative 180 87 32.6 16 11 40.7 33.41 
Overall -
percentage 
  78.5   79.2 78.6 
 
 
 Percentage of Correctly Classified Firms 
 Table 3.3 provides the percentages of correctly classified IOFs and cooperative firms using 
the bootstrapped logistic model. The results show that, on average 78.5 percent of the selected 
sample (90% of the total observations) was correctly classified, while 79.2 percent of the 
unselected sample (10% of the total observations) was correctly classified. The model 
performs better when classifying IOFs rather than cooperatives. In total, the model classifies 
94.3 percent of the IOFs correctly, while 33.41 percent of the cooperatives were correctly 
classified.  
 The difference in the predictive performance of the model may be due to the fact that 
cooperatives are more heterogeneous than IOFs. The financial structure and characteristics of 
cooperatives across different European countries are largely determined by the characteristics 
and cultural background of local communities, whereas IOFs operating across countries are 
publicly traded and have a clearly defined objective to maximize profit. For instance, the 
cooperatives in Ireland have 50 percent of their capital base publicly traded, while the 
cooperatives in none of the other countries in our sample have any of their capital-base 
publicly traded (Harte, 1997). Also, the milk price system used by Dutch and Belgian 
cooperatives differs from the one used by French and German cooperatives.  The cooperatives 
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in the first group of countries pay a proportion of the price to their milk suppliers relative to 
the firm’s performance, while the cooperatives in the second group of countries pay a 
predetermined and fixed price, which is not related to the firms’ performance (Zwanenberg et 
al., 1993). Another issue is the cultural characteristics of cooperatives in the different 
countries which will reflect on their policy to invest, produce  and sell in the international 
arena (Ebneth and Theuvsen, 2005). Ebneth and Theuvsen found that German and French 
cooperatives in particular are less internationally oriented than Dutch and Belgian 
cooperatives.           
 
  Description of the Classified Firms 
Describing the statistics of the cooperatives and IOFs, which were both correctly and wrongly 
classified, allows us to identify the variables that differentiate correctly from wrongly 
classified firms. Table 3.4 below describes the correctly and wrongly classified firms and 
indicates the results of statistical testing (F-test) of whether the firms are significantly 
different at the 1% and 5% critical levels. The difference between the correctly and wrongly 
classified cooperatives is significant (at 5%) for five indicators out of nine (i.e., PTA, MC, 
DR, FT and TA) and for four indicators (PTA, DTA, FT and TA) in case of IOFs. Material cost 
and debt ratio are significantly different between the correctly and wrongly classified 
cooperatives and not for IOFs. The total debt is significantly different between the correctly 
and wrongly classified IOFs and not for cooperatives 
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Table 3.4: The Characteristics of the Firms Correctly and Wrongly Classified 
Mean (Std Dev.) 
Correctly classified Wrongly classified 
Variable 
(Denotation 
IOF Coop IOF1 Coop2 
Profitability 
 
    
Profit (PTA) 0.053 (0.077) -0.0238 (0.074) -0.053 (0.171)* 0.017 (0.041)* 
Material cost (MC) 0.176 (0.404) 0.372 (1.371) 0.085 (0.169) 0.117 (0.327)** 
Capital financing     
Total Debt (DTA) 0.703 (0.202) 0.613 (0.222) 0.642 (0.292)** 0.653 (0.155) 
Long- term debt 
ratio (DR) 
0.785 (3.301) 1.595 (5.949) 0.579 (1.553) 0.437 (0.865)* 
Current ratio (CR) 1.318 (1.314) 1.481 (0.598) 1.470 (0.790) 1.516 (0.1.38) 
Operational 
efficiency 
    
Fixed Asset 
Turnover (FT) 
12.75 (22.73) 110.6(285.7) 45.09 (118.3)* 15.77 (19.71)* 
Inventories  
turnover (IT) 
46.23 (23.62) 40.46(14.60) 41.69 (17.78) 43.18 (14.90) 
Equity growth 
 
 
    
Equity Growth 
(EG) 
1.365 (14.48) 1.511 (7.887) 0.431 (1.688) 0.527 (2.538) 
Size factor     
Total assts/ 
x100000 
0.475 (0.955) 2.75 (4.990) 1.164 (0.955)* 0.434 (0.521)* 
1 (2)
: The significant level of the difference between the correctly classified IOFs 
(cooperatives) with the wrongly classified IOFs (cooperatives) * at 1%; ** at 5%.   
 
 
The wrongly classified cooperatives make more profit and have lower material cost, 
long-term debt ratios, fixed assets to turnover and firm size than the correctly classified 
cooperatives. The wrongly classified IOFs make less profit, have a higher value of total debt, 
a higher value of fixed assets turnover and larger firm size than the correctly classified IOFs. 
The implication here is that the cooperatives which are more profitable tend to be smaller in 
size and have low MC, DR and FT, whereas the lower profitable IOFs tend to be larger in size 
and have low DTA and high FT.  
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3.6 Conclusion and Implications   
 
The objective of this study is to analyze the financial and performance characteristics that 
distinguish European dairy processing cooperatives from IOFs.  
The results show that European dairy processing cooperatives are different from IOFs 
and that cooperatives are more heterogeneous. Cooperatives are significantly distinguished 
from IOFs in terms of profitability, material cost, total debt, turnover to fixed assets and 
turnover to inventories. On the other hand long-term debt, current and growth ratios were 
insignificant in distinguishing dairy cooperatives from IOFs. The European dairy cooperatives 
that were analysed in this study tend to have a lower profit, a higher material cost, a lower 
ratio of total debt to total assets, a higher ratio of turnover to fixed assets, a lower ratio of 
turnover to inventories and a larger size than IOFs. The results of the total debt and turnover 
to fixed assets contradict a priori theoretical expectations. None of the country dummy 
variables were significant, which indicates that any differences in the accounting and tax 
system or other country-specific factors do not distinguish dairy cooperatives from IOFs. 
Cooperatives showed more heterogeneous results in terms of the mean value of the indicators 
for cooperatives, i.e. higher variance of the variables used in the empirical analysis than the 
IOFs. Moreover, only 33.4 percent of the cooperatives were classified correctly in comparison 
to 94.3 percent of the IOFs. The larger heterogeneity among cooperatives complicates their 
correct classification based on the estimation results. Cooperatives across countries have 
different traditions, financial characteristic and managerial attitude, while IOFs seem to have 
more homogenous financial characteristics. 
These differences between the two types of dairy processing firms have implications 
for their flexibility to cope with the challenges ahead and to accommodate the effects of the 
policy changes in the EU. Since both dairy processing cooperatives and IOFs sell dairy 
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products and operate under the same competitive market conditions, the results of profitability 
imply that IOFs produce more profitable products, have lower costs or higher operational 
efficiency.  
The issue of higher costs was studied by investigating the influence of the material 
cost which includes the payment to the raw milk. Cooperatives, on average have higher 
material costs than IOFs and since milk payment comprises the largest part of the material 
cost (in the database), higher material cost might result from the fact that cooperatives pay a 
higher price for raw milk and may therefore be preferred by dairy farmers. 
The issue of operational efficiency was studied by investigating the influence of 
turnover to fixed assets and turnover to inventories. Cooperatives tend to have a higher ratio 
of turnover to fixed assts and a lower ratio of turnover to inventories. These results suggest 
that cooperatives have a better operational efficiency than IOFs. In terms of operational 
efficiency (FT and IT), dairy farmers would prefer a cooperative rather than an IOF.     
Cooperatives tend to have a lower ratio of total debt to total assets size than IOFs. This 
indicates that the financial position of the cooperatives allows them to acquire more debt 
capital, if needed, i.e. cooperatives have a greater financial flexibility than IOFs. This 
suggests that dairy cooperatives have a strong financial position and are well equipped for 
making investments in innovations and new acquisitions. 
 The implications of our results are that cooperatives are, on average less profitable, 
pay a higher milk price to farmers, operate more efficiently, and have a stronger financial 
position than IOFs. Therefore, cooperatives seem well-equipped to deal with the challenges 
ahead. Given their financial flexibility and their ability to pay a higher milk price, they may 
provide a more important role than IOFs in providing a soft landing for the expected 
abolishment of the quota system and the foreseen reduction of dairy subsidies. However, it 
should be noted that future research could shed more light on the importance of cooperatives 
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and IOFs under the future conditions. Additional insights would particularly be needed on 
issues such as the internal pricing system, the internal organization and differences in access 
to financial capital. Also, future research would greatly benefit from more information on the 
dairy processing firms on their degree of specialization and globalization. 
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 Abstract 
 
This chapter compares the technical efficiency and the production technology of dairy 
processing cooperatives and investor-owned firms in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Ireland and France. Two parametric production frontiers are estimated for 
cooperatives and investor-owned firms separately, which are used to evaluate the intra- and 
inter-type technical efficiency of each firm. The models are estimated using accountancy data 
from the AMADEUS data base over the years 1995-2005. Results show that dairy 
cooperatives have more productive technology, but are overall slightly less efficient than 
investor-owned firms. Differences in production technology and technical efficiency of the 
cooperatives across countries reflect differences in local market conditions and characteristics 
of the companies. Both cooperatives and investor-owned firms are characterized by 
decreasing returns to scale. However, the scale of operation is much larger for cooperatives. 
 
Keywords:  Dairy Cooperatives, Technological differences, technological gap    
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Evaluating the production efficiency of cooperatives and comparing it with investor-owned 
firms is meaningless if fundamental differences between IOF’s and cooperatives are ignored.  
Cooperatives differ in their assumed objectives and organizational structure from IOFs and 
these differences are not independent of their production technology. They are justified by the 
dual relationship between the cooperatives and their members in comparison to the more 
simple relationship between the shareholders and their firm. As for cooperatives, members are 
the owners, controllers3 and the main (if not the only) user of the cooperative  (Sexton & 
Iskow, 1988) who seek other objectives rather than maximizing the rate of return to equity. 
Whereas, within the IOF shareholders are not the users of the firm and are basically interested 
in maximizing profit.  
The dual objectives of the cooperatives are defined in different ways in the theoretical 
and the empirical literature. Among the members’ long-term interests in marketing 
cooperative is (i) having a guaranteed access to market outlets for their outputs and (ii) a 
strong competitive position so that members receive competitive payments for their outputs. 
Marketing cooperatives are expected to be the first who put price increases for the supplier of 
the farm product on the agenda. Various objectives of the cooperative are suggested in the 
literature, such as: service at cost, maximizing the aggregate members’ profit, maximizing the 
joint profit of the cooperative firms and the aggregate members’ profit (Soboh et al., 2009).  
The organizational structure of cooperatives differs from IOFs due to the fact that their 
objectives and those of its members are more closely aligned4 than the objectives of the 
principals (shareholders) and their agents (firms) in the IOF (Bontems & Fulton, 2005). This 
alignment of objectives, which incorporate the user-owner and user-controller characteristic 
of the cooperatives, shapes the organizational structure of the cooperative in the long-run 
(Bontems and Fulton, 2005).   
The differences in both objectives and organizational structure imply that not only the 
business model of cooperatives (from entrepreneurial perspective) differs from the one of the 
IOFs in terms of the trade-offs between revenue sources, cost drivers, volume of investments 
and success factor - as suggested by Hamermesh et al. (2002)- but also in terms of decision 
making processes. Cooperatives, which are mainly financed by members, are more risk averse 
                                                 
3
 Members, as owners (residual claimants), are entitled to the net income generated by the firm and also the residual risk bearers of the firm’s 
net cash flows. While members, as controllers (have the residual right to control), have the rights to any assets that are not assigned to other 
parties nor attenuated by law (Chaddad and Cook, 2004).   
4
 However, there are examples in the literature which shows that this alignment is not perfect. For instance, with a heterogeneous 
membership, non members owners, distributional issues (see Carson (1979) and Sexton (1986)). 
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and are less likely to launch new ventures, which suggest less diversification for cooperatives 
rather than for IOFs. Therefore, the market orientation of cooperatives differs from the one of 
IOFs, which tends to target the higher risk and higher value added segments of the market. 
The cooperatives’ drivers of cost reduction focus on improving members’ income, which 
implies that cooperatives are more concerned with reducing operational costs other than costs 
related to members’ products. Cooperatives’ investments in new product portfolios are 
restricted by the members’ reluctance to engage into risky new revenue streams. The ability of 
cooperatives to process the potential capacity growth of its members is a major determining 
factor for investment. The cooperatives success factors are the competencies of cooperative to 
be sustainably fulfilling the members’ objectives. To a large extent these success factors are 
similar to those characterizing IOFs, yet it should be kept in mind that the IOFs goals are 
more closely linked to profitability.  The cooperatives first concern is to process all of its 
members’ products and to process and valorise this optimally.  IOFs on the other hand 
determine their markets on the basis of profit maximising. The size of their operation is 
dependent on their market strategy and they are not obliged to process a predetermined 
quantity.  
Different objectives and organizational structure and the implications of these, will 
also affect the cooperatives production technology and technical efficiency vis-à-vis the 
cooperative. Bontems and Fulton (2005) used agency theory to argue that the strong 
alignment of objectives (members with their cooperative) within the cooperatives gives some 
advantages to cooperatives’ production efficiency over the IOFs’. Contrary to argument of 
Bontems and Fulton (2005); Oustapassidis et al. (1998) argued that cooperatives due to their 
organizational characteristics which endorse over-supply of members’ inputs are 
disadvantaged, and therefore less scale efficient. Moreover, Porte and Scully (1987), Ferrier 
and Porter (1991), and Gentzoglanis (1997), also argued that cooperatives are less scale-
efficient due to higher costs of control when there are many principals having an incentive to 
free-ride on others’ efforts. The recognition that cooperatives and IOF’s have different 
technologies suggests that the common practice of modelling the cooperative as having an 
identical production structure is theoretically ungrounded (Bontems and Fulton, 2005).  
The present study uses a parametric frontier approach to efficiency measurement to 
evaluate and compare the technical efficiency of dairy cooperatives with that of IOFs. The 
chapter aims to estimate a firm type-specific (cooperatives and IOFs) production frontier to 
statistically test on differences. Firm type-specific production frontiers and firm-specific 
efficiency parameters allow obtaining intra- and inter- type technical efficiency 
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measurements. Intra-type technical efficiency involves computing the efficiency of a 
particular firm’s (of particular type, either cooperatives or IOFs) relative to the frontier of this 
firm’s particular type. This efficiency measurement reveals this firm’s performance relative to 
its type’s technology. Inter-firm technical efficiency involves computing the efficiency of that 
same firm relative to the frontier of the firm type that represents the best practice. Inter-type 
(IE) efficiency is decomposed into intra-type efficiency (IA) and inter-type catch-up (CU) 
components, where the CU component reflects the potential for improving performance by 
adopting the other firm type’s technology. A CU of a firm of certain type (for instance 
cooperative) lower than one indicates that the technology of the other type is better than the 
technology of the firm’s own type. The catch-up component may include differences in 
technology across the two types of firms occur from differences in the incentives (and 
therefore the pace) to adapt and invest in new technologies and/or input quality differences 
(Oude Lansink et al., 2001). The empirical application focuses on data from cooperatives and 
IOFs in the dairy processing industry in Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, 
Germany and France. 
    
 
4.2 Econometrics Methodology  
 
The present study uses a parametric frontier approach to efficiency measurement to evaluate 
and compare the technical efficiency of dairy cooperatives with that of IOFs. The parametric 
approach to efficiency measurement has been implemented widely in several industries. See, 
for instance, Schmidt(1986), Lovell and Schmidt(1988), and Bauer(1990) each for an 
overview of modelling and estimating the parametric frontier functions in relation to the 
efficiency measurement and Battese (1992) for a survey of  application of the parametric (or 
stochastic) frontier analysis to technical efficiency measurement in the agricultural sector. 
Application of the parametric frontier approach to comparing efficiency of cooperatives and 
IOFs has been previously undertaken by Sexton et al. (1989), Doucouliagos and Hone (2000), 
Singh et al. (2001), Mosheim (2002)5. In these studies, measuring and comparing the 
technical efficiency of both types of firm (cooperative and IOF) is conducted assuming IOF’s 
and cooperatives employ the same production technology.  
 
                                                 
5
 See Soboh et al., (2009) for an extended list of literature used similar techniques while comparing the 
performance of cooperatives to IOFs. 
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The stochastic frontier production model was presented independently by Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) has been theoretically and empirically implemented on firms of different 
industries and sectors (see Coelli, 1995). Measuring production efficiency allows one to test 
competing hypotheses regarding sources of efficiency or differences in productivity (Farrell, 
1957; Lovell and Schmidt, 1988). Moreover, such measurement allows for quantifying the 
potential increases in output that might be associated with an increase in efficiency (Farrell, 
1957).  
In this chapter, two Translog production frontiers (i.e. for cooperatives and IOFs 
separately) are estimated using data on three inputs and one output of dairy processing firms 
in the EU. The stochastic frontier model, assuming an exponential distribution of the non-
negative random term iu  is expressed as:  
)(),( ii uvii exfY −= β , i=1,...,N       (1) 
where Y
i 
is the output of the i-th dairy firm; ix
 
is a k×1 vector of the input quantities of the i-th 
type of firm; β is a parameter vector. Moreover, iν  represents the random disturbance term 
that is assumed to be i.i.d. N(0, 2νσ ). This random term ( iν ) is incorporated into the model and 
is independent of iu . The non-negative random term ( iu ) represents technical inefficiency in 
production and is assumed to be i.i.d. and exponential distribution. The relationship between 
iu and the output oriented technical efficiency (TE) is: )exp( ii uTE −= . 
Estimating the two type–specific production frontiers (cooperatives and IOFs) allows 
for measuring technical efficiency of the firm relative to the frontier for: (1) its own type and 
(2) the best practice frontier. Using this approach we can measure the inter-type catch up 
component. Measuring technical efficiency indicates that the best practice frontier can either 
be the same type of the firm or the other type. Measuring the technical efficiency of the firms 
relative to the other type’s frontier (if it was the best practice frontier) indicates a potential 
improvement in the technical efficiency of any firm of a particular type when adapting the 
other type’s technology. Using terminologies used by Oude Lansink et al. (2000, 2001), the 
first measurement is called intra- type efficiency (i.e. efficiency of the firm relative to its own 
type frontier) , while the second is called inter-type efficiency (i.e. efficiency of the firm 
relative to the best practice frontier). To illustrate these concepts, take the case of an IOF 
(Figure 4.1): 
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The actual output produced by the IOF firm is YI, IY '  refers to the maximum obtainable 
output from the frontier of the firm’s type: 
)(' III XfY =              (2) 
While IY"  refers to the maximum obtainable output from the best practice frontier: 
)](),([max"
,
IcIICII
XfXfY =              (3) 
 
Figure 4.1 An Illustration of an IOF Produces (YI) Below Both Frontiers.                                      
  
Y: output ; X: input 
 
The intra-type efficiency (IA)  is defined as: 
                                                 IA = 
I
I
Y
Y
'
;       10 ≤< IA            (4) 
The inter-type efficiency (IE) is defined as: 
  IE = 
I
I
Y
Y
"
;       10 ≤< IE     (5) 
The catch-up (CU) component is the ratio of output obtained at the own type frontier and 
the output obtained at the best practice frontier:  
  CU  = 
I
I
Y
Y
"
'
;      10 ≤< CU       (6) 
 
* IOF  
IOF  
Coop 
YI 
Y’I 
 
Y”I 
Y 
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The relation between these measurements is : 
   
I
I
I
I
I
I
Y
YIE
Y
Y
Y
YIEIACUIE
"'
  
"
'
=⇒×=⇒×=      (7) 
 
The critical point is when CU of any type (i.e. coop or IOF) is equal to 1. Firms, of certain 
type, with CU = 1 perform better with their own type technology than the other type’s. 
While firms, of certain type, with CU<1 perform worse with their own type technology 
rather than the other type’s technology and therefore have a potential for technological 
improvement. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the four possible situations: a cooperative above the IOF’s 
frontier (Coop1), an IOF above the cooperative’s frontier (IOF2), a cooperative below 
both frontiers (Coop2), and an IOF below both frontiers (IOF1).        
 
Figure 4.2: Cooperatives and IOFs Represented by Two Frontiers.  
 
------: Cooperative; ______ : IOF ;  Y: output ; X: input 
 
 
 
 
 
* IOF1 
* IOF2 
* Coop1 
* Coop2 
X 
Y 
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4.3 Data and Empirical Model 
 
4.3.1 Data  
 
Panel data on dairy processing firms from six European countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands) were used in this study. These countries are 
considered to be the European states that produce the bulk of the EU cow’s milk. The panel 
data cover the period 1995-2005 is obtained from AMADEUS. AMADEUS is a European 
financial data base prepared by Bureau van Dijk and contains more than 5 million private, 
cooperative and public companies. The data-base is collected from reports produced by the 
chamber of commerce of the different European countries. AMADEUS unified the figures of 
the financial statements of the different countries. Our sample consists of 1221 observations 
among which 861 are IOFs and 360 are cooperatives.    
The model distinguishes one output (total turnover), three inputs (material cost, 
employment cost, and fixed assets)  and a time trend variable (T). The outputs and inputs are 
expressed in Euros of 1996 (base year) by deflating the monetary values with their price 
indexes (provided by Eurostat).  
The dairy plants in these countries are typically producing more than one product. 
However, the available data report total revenues and do not distinguish between revenues 
from different outputs. Output is measured as total operating revenue from selling all products 
produced by the processing company, deflated by the country-specific price index of 
consumer prices for milk, cheese and egg.  
Fixed asset is measured as the value of physical land, buildings, machinery, and the 
non-physical fixed assets: such as the goodwill, patents, brands, and market shares. The value 
was deflated using the average value of the prices index of the agricultural gross fixed capital 
formation and the price index of the agricultural machinery and equipment per country. 
The data base provides us with an input titled as “material cost”. This input variable 
refers to the cost of purchasing the input materials before the processing operation starts. This 
input mainly consists of raw milk purchased by the dairy plant. We used the deflated EC-
index of producer prices of the cows’ milk per country as the deflator for the material cost.   
Labor cost is deflated using the nominal value of the labor cost index in total industries 
(excluding public administration).  
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Table 4.1 provides the mean, minimum and maximum values of turnover, fixed assets, 
raw material, and labor. It shows that cooperatives have, on average, a higher value of the 
output and three inputs than IOFs. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (Million Euros) 
Cooperatives (n=360 ) Investor-owned firms (IOFs) (n=861)  
Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum 
 
Output 429.26 2.91 5513.82 96.45 2.58 1605.03 
Fixed assets 108.30 0.03 2243.13 19.59 0.01 406.47 
Raw Material 202.57 0.04 4604.08 7.25 0.03 222.31 
Labor 24.85 0.01 742.61 1.12 0.01 24.09 
 
 
4.3.2 Empirical Model  
 
The type-specific frontier for each type of firms in the sample is assumed to follow a Translog 
specification: 
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Where itx are input quantities at time t, with i = 1 (fixed assets), 2 (raw materials), and 3 
(Labour). A time trend T is included in the empirical model to account for exogenous 
technological change in the estimation.  The coefficients of the 3 inputs ( iβ , i =1,2,3), the 
quadratic part of the model ( ijβ , i and j =1,2,3), the time trend ( 1γ ), its quadratic term ( 2γ ), 
and the cross term of the time trend with the inputs ( iγ , i =1,2,3) are to be estimated.     
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4.4 Results 
 
The log-likelihood-test which tests the null hypothesis of no difference in production 
technology between IOFs and cooperatives yields a value of 686. This implies that the null 
hypothesis is rejected at 5%. In what follows, we will discuss the parameter estimates and the 
estimates of technical efficiency assuming two separate production frontiers for IOFs and 
cooperatives. 
Table 4.2 provides the estimation results of the two production frontiers. The number 
of significant (at 5%) coefficients of the cooperatives’ production frontier is six, whereas nine 
coefficients were significant at critical 5% level for the IOFs’ production frontier. Only three 
parameters (single terms of material cost, labor, and the quadratic term of fixed assets) are 
significant for both frontiers. The parameter estimates of six terms have opposite signs for the 
two frontiers (such as: the time trend).  
 
Table 4.2: Results of Estimation of the Type Specific Frontiers (p-values in brackets) 
Variable Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms (IOFs)  
 
Constant 
 
12.138 (0.000) 
  
 4.979 ( 0.000) 
Ln(x1) -0.560 (0.000) -0.105 (0.403) 
Ln(x2) -0.536 (0.018) -0.344 (0.049) 
Ln(x3)   0.573 (0.004) 0.810 (0.000) 
T -0.007 (0.959) 0.382 (0.000) 
Ln(x1) Ln(x2) 0.011 (0.550) 0.020 (0.164) 
Ln(x1) Ln(x3) -0.020 (0.162) -0.036 (0.030) 
Ln(x1) T 0.004 ( 0.621) -0.024 (0.000) 
Ln(x2) Ln(x3) -0.052 (0.000) 0.004 (0.747) 
Ln(x2) T -0.001 (0.915) 0.015 (0.054) 
Ln(x3) T -0.009 (0.435) -0.024 (0.001) 
½ [Ln(x1) Ln(x1)] 0.124 (0.000) 0.124 (0.000) 
½ [Ln(x2) Ln(x2)] 0.086 (0.000) -0.002 (0.924) 
½ [Ln(x3) Ln(x3)] 0.032 (0.248) -0.028 (0.186) 
½ T2 -0.001 (0.970) -0.010 (0.052) 
x1= fixed assets; x2 = raw material; x3 = labour and T = time trend 
 
Table 4.3 provides annual mean, maximum and minimum value of the three different 
efficiency measurements across countries and at for the entire sample, (intra-firm (IA), Catch-
                                                 
6
 The result of the log-Likelihood ratio test yields a value of (66) in testing the hypothesis of difference in the 
production technology of the IOFs with the cooperatives with comparable turnover size (i.e. excluding the 
cooperatives that are larger than the IOFs). This implies that the size of the turnover does not alter the difference 
between the production technology of IOFs and cooperatives.  
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Up (CU) and Inter-firm efficiency (IE)). Additionally, these measurements were presented by 
country to investigate any differences across countries.   
 
Table 4.3: Efficiency Scores and Catch-Up Components 
Cooperatives Investor-owned firms (IOFs)  Difference 
 
IAC IEC CUC  IAI IEI CUI  CUC-CUI 
 
Belgium 0.81 0.81 1  0.78 0.65 0.8166  0.1834 
Denmark 0.62 0.62 1  0.75 0.65 0.8593  0.1407 
France 0.74 0.74 1  0.80 0.70 0.8580  0.1420 
Germany 0.82 0.82 1  0.78 0.67 0.8547  0.1453 
Ireland 0.83 0.83 1  0.81 0.58 0.6872  0.3128 
Netherlands 0.78 0.78 1  0.72 0.62 0.8094  0.1906 
Total (Mean) 0.76 0.76 1  0.79 0.68 0.8142  0.1858   
  
 
The results in table 3 show that the average intra-firm efficiency score for cooperatives 
(IAC) is lower than intra-firm efficiency score for IOFs (IAI).  This indicates that cooperatives 
are, on average, less efficient relative to their own technology than IOFs.  The results across 
countries show that cooperatives in Denmark and France have a better intra-firm efficiency 
than IOFs. Therefore, cooperatives in these countries better succeed in exploiting their 
technology to its full potential than IOFs. It is important to indicate, that the efficiency 
measurements reflect, not only the efficiency of the physical transformation of inputs into 
outputs but also implicitly the success of marketing strategies so as to generate more value 
added and output quality differences between companies of the same type (cooperative or 
IOF).        
Additionally, the results in Table 4.3 show that, on average, the catch-up component 
of cooperatives (CUC) equals one whereas the catch-up component of IOFs (CUI) is on 
average approximately equal to 0.8. The difference between the two catch-up components 
(CUC and CUI) is on average equal to 0.1858. This result indicates the superiority of the 
cooperatives’ technology over the IOFs technology. The difference is attributable to a better 
technology of the physical transformation of inputs into outputs and to quality differences and 
differences in the success of marketing strategies between IOFs and cooperatives. However, 
the difference between the catch-up components (CUC and CUI) differs across countries. For 
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example, Denmark, has the lowest value of the difference in catch up components between 
IOFs and cooperatives (0.1407). This suggests that the superiority of the cooperatives’ 
technology over that of the IOFs is less apparent in Denmark. Ireland has the highest value of 
the difference in catch-up component (0.3128), suggesting that the cooperatives’ technology 
is the most superior to the IOFs’ technology in this country.  
The difference in catch-up component between IOFs and cooperatives across countries 
is explained by cross-country differences in the (i) characteristics of cooperatives/IOFs and 
(ii) market conditions for cooperatives/IOFs. An exception is the results in Denmark, which 
requires analyzing the characteristics of Danish firms, dairy market and the degree of 
production specialty of the Danish IOFs.  
(i) The characteristics of the cooperatives differ across countries in terms of their financial 
structure (partially traded in the public market or not), market orientation and membership 
(targeting international markets or not). The differences in the financial structure of 
cooperatives refer to the level of control and ownership of members of the cooperative. For 
instance, cooperatives in Ireland can trade about half of their equity in the stock market, 
which implies more diversity in the sources of capital (Edward et al., 2007). This, relative 
diversified source of capital for the Irish cooperatives7, in addition to the characteristics of the 
Irish dairy sector, may explain the large difference in the catch up components of cooperatives 
and IOFs for Ireland. The differences in the market orientation of the cooperatives across 
countries refer to whether the cooperative is targeting international markets or not. 
Cooperatives in Denmark (which exports around 2/3 of the total milk production), the 
Netherlands, and Belgium are found to target international markets more than French and 
German cooperatives (Ebneth & Theuvsen, 2005). The Irish cooperatives are mainly 
exporting their production to the UK, which is encouraged by the geographical location and 
the strong UK pound relative to the Euro. 
(ii) The local market conditions for cooperatives refer mainly to the cooperatives’ 
market share which reflects the degree of competitiveness in the local market and the 
opportunity to exercise market power. As an example, one large cooperative in Denmark 
produces more than 90% of Danish milk production, whereas there are more than 10 other 
small cooperatives which handle around 6% of Danish milk production. This leaves the 
Danish IOFs to process less than 3% of the total Danish milk production (Danish dairy 
                                                 
7
 Termed as public limited companies (PLC). The PLC is not obliged to take in more milk of members or new 
membership (Harte, 1997). 
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board8). The large proportion of the processed milk by cooperative (around 97% - the largest 
in Europe) reflects that the majority of the Danish farmers are cooperative oriented and that 
Danish IOFs must be highly specialized with loyal customers. The characteristics of the 
Danish market suggest that the countervailing power of cooperatives is working and that the 
dairy market is mainly exploited by cooperatives, which leaves no (or little) margin for any 
further cooperative exploitation. The situation of the dairy processing industry in Ireland, 
however, is largely fragmented and dominated by three relatively not so large cooperatives9. 
The Irish cooperatives have weak incentives to consolidate and they achieve efficiency by co-
processing arrangement and milk-sharing arrangements rather than by expanding revenue 
areas. The Irish dairy sector is not fully exploited and has potential to improve cooperatives’ 
share of the dairy processing sector (Edward et al., 2007). In the Netherlands, there are two 
large cooperatives (presently merged into a single one), processing about 85% of the total 
milk production in the Netherlands, whereas three small cooperatives account for another 6% 
of total Dutch milk production (Productschap Zuivel). The German and French cooperatives 
account for less than 60% and 40% of the local dairy market, respectively (Productschap 
Zuivel)10.   
To further analyze the results, we compare the number and the characteristics of the 
firms with catch up component equal to one to those with catch up component lower than one 
in Table 4.4.    
Only one cooperative (of the 360 cooperatives) has a catch up value less than one, 
whereas, only seven IOFs (of the 861 IOFs) have a catch-up value equal to one. These seven 
IOFs have, on average, a higher turnover, fixed assets and raw materials but lower use of 
labor than the other IOFs. Also, these seven IOFs have, on average a higher efficiency score 
(0.87) than the other IOFs (0.79). Whereas, the single cooperative (with CUC <1) does not 
appear to have different characteristics (in terms of value of output and inputs) than the 
average characteristics of the other cooperatives (with CUC =1). The intra-firm efficiency 
score of cooperatives (IAC) of the only cooperative with CUC <1 is equal to 0.86 and is higher 
than the average value of the intra-cooperatives efficiency score (0.76), of the other 
cooperatives (with CUC=1).   
 
 
                                                 
8
 These figures are estimated based on data available on (www.mejeri.dk). 
9
 When compared to the large cooperatives in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
10
 The cooperatives’ market share per country is ordered from largest: DK, NL, Ire, B, D, Fr. (based on 
estimation based on data from (www.prodzuivel.nl)  
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Table 4.4: The Characteristics of the Firms with Different Values of the Catch-Up  
Cooperatives Investors Owned Firms  Item (average) 
Million Euros CUC =1 CUC <1 CUI =1 CUI <1 
 
Number of firms 359 1 7 854 
Turnover 430.38 450.73 155.57 95.96 
Fixed assets 108.43 100.09 9.75 19.67 
Raw Material 203.13 187.79 29.97 7.07 
Labor 24.92 30.36 0.93 1.12 
Intra-Firm Efficiency  0.76 0.86 0.87 0.79 
 
 
Almost 100 per cent of the cooperatives have a catch-up value of one, whereas around 99 
per cent of the IOFs have a catch-up value less than one. These results show that the 
technology of relatively small IOFs (in terms of turnover) is dominated by the technology of 
the cooperatives. The IOFs with a catch-up term smaller than one have a relatively high value 
of both fixed assets and labor compared to the seven IOFs with a catch-up term equal to one. 
This relatively high value of fixed assets and labor of the small IOF may be due to their high 
costs in producing a limited quantity of specialized output from a relatively small quantity of 
raw materials. From these results, it may be suggested that small IOFs, in order to improve 
their technical efficiency and to prevent losses due to inadequate organization adapt strategies 
which either reduce the use of both fixed assets and labor or increase the level of output.  
The differences in Intra-firm Efficiency (IA) confirm that IOFs have different internal 
incentives and are focused on other market segments than IOFs. The cooperatives first 
intention is to collect and processes the members’ entire production while IOFs draw their 
incentives from collecting and processing the milk quantity that maximizes shareholder value. 
As a result, IOFs’ are inclined to target different market segments than the cooperatives. The 
high value-added segment of the market requires high quality in production, packaging and 
marketing, while quantities will be much lower than in coops, which explains the relatively 
high value of fixed assets to total output of the small and less efficient IOFs. Second, targeting 
the value added segment of the market requires highly skilled and specialized labor and 
management, which explains the relatively high value of labor to total output of the small and 
the lower inter-firm (overall) efficiency of IOFs. The management team in the cooperative, 
however, is required to meet members’ demands by processing their entire production while 
paying them (for providing the raw material) a long term competitive price.  
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 Studying the differences of the output elasticities between the firms with CU equal to 
unity and those with CU less than unity provides additional information on the impact of 
increases in input on the quantity of output. Table 4.5 provides the average value of the output 
elasticities of cooperatives and IOFs and the p-value, testing whether the elasticity is 
statistically significantly different from zero. The output elasticities of the firms (of both 
types) with catch-up equal to one are different from the firms with catch-up less than unity.   
 
Table 4.5: Output and Scale Elasticities (p-Values in Brackets) 
Cooperatives  Investor-owned firms (IOFs) Output 
elasticity of 
(p-value)11 
CUC =1 
N=359 
CUC <1 
n=1 
CUI =1 
n=7 
CUI <1 
n=854 
 
Fixed assets 
 
0.569 (0.000) 0.135 0.629 
 
0.593(0.00) 
Raw Material -0.102 (0.001) -0.114 0.056 0.034 (0.133) 
 
Labor 0.071 (0.013) 0.100 -0.017 0.022(0.359) 
Time 
-0.037 (0.005) -0.0459 -0.021 -0.012 (0.194) 
Elasticity of 
scale 0.623 (0.020) 0.121 0.668 0.646 (0.028) 
 
 
The results, presented in table 5, show that the output elasticity of fixed assets (which 
includes brand value) has the highest value (if compared with output elasticity in terms of the 
other inputs and time trend).  Therefore, this input (fixed assets) is important for both IOFs 
and cooperatives. However, fixed assets is more important to IOFs (with CUI = 1 and CUI <1) 
than cooperatives (with CUC = 1 and CUC <1). The output elasticity of fixed assets is 
significantly different from zero for cooperatives with CUC = 1 and the IOFs with CUI < 1. 
The output elasticity of raw materials is negative for cooperatives and is significantly 
different from zero at the critical 5% level for the cooperatives with catch-up component 
equal to one, while it is insignificant and positive for IOFs. This difference indicates that an 
increase in the quantity of raw materials (which is mainly raw milk) decreases output of 
cooperatives while it increases output of IOFs. The difference is explained by the 
cooperative’s obligation to process the entire production of its members, adding to that the 
incentive given by the common agricultural policy (CAP) allowing dairy processing 
                                                 
11
  We evaluated the p-value of the elasticities by directly interpreting the first order effects as elasticities, 
because the input variables were normalized by their geometric means prior to estimating the same frontier 
model. The hypothesis testing with respect to the elasticity of scale is simple since by definition it is a linear 
combination of parameters that have been estimated (by using Oaxaca’s decomposition). 
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companies to produce low value added commodities for inventories (e.g. butter, milk 
powder). However, in order to explain the negative output elasticity of materials for 
cooperatives, more information on quality differences of materials and the composition of 
output is needed. This result may suggest that (i) the quality of raw milk provided to 
cooperatives is worse than the quality provided to IOFs (leading to a lower supply response), 
(ii) that the production technology of cooperatives is over-used due to their obligation to 
process all members milk, or (iii) the value of the raw materials is more costly to cooperatives 
than to IOFs.  
The output elasticity of labor is positive and is higher for cooperatives than for IOFs.  
It has a negative value for IOFs with catch-up component equal to unity. Moreover, the output 
elasticity of labor is significantly different from zero only for cooperatives with catch-up 
component equal to unity. The high value of the output elasticity of cooperatives indicates 
that labor is more important to cooperatives than to IOFs in producing output. The importance 
of labor to cooperatives (when compared to IOFs) may suggest cooperatives aim to reduce all 
other operational cost (in order to pay the highest price for raw materials), which implies to 
have few but highly qualified labor.  Additionally, the value of the output elasticity in terms 
of labor is negative for the seven IOFs with catch-up component that equals unity, this implies 
that as labor increases the output decreases for these IOFs.    
Also, technical change of cooperatives and IOFs is negative, which indicates that, the 
technology of dairy processing firms on average gets worse over time, although not with 
equal speed for cooperatives and IOFs. The cooperatives’ technology gets worse over time 
more quickly than the IOFs technology. Also, IOFs with a catch-up component less than 
unity(CUI<1) have the lowest technical regress, implying that these IOFs (although not highly 
efficient and using inferior technology) are relatively better off.  
Finally, results in Table 4.5 show that firms of both types have production 
technologies that are characterized by decreasing returns to scale. The cooperatives’ 
technology is facing a more pronounced degree of decreasing returns to scale than IOFs’. 
Furthermore, results show that IOFs with catch-up component equal to unity (CUI=1) have 
the lowest degree of decreasing returns to scale. This finding implies that an increase in the 
size of operation has a more positive effect on IOFs rather than cooperatives, and may be a 
direct consequence of the larger size of cooperatives and their obligation to process all 
members’ milk.  
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
This study contributes to the literature in using two different frontiers to compare and measure 
the technical efficiency and production technology of dairy processing cooperatives and IOFs 
in six European countries. The methodological approach uses a different frontier for each type 
of firm, allowing for measuring technical efficiency of the firm with respect to both: its own 
type frontier (intra-type efficiency) and the frontier of the other type (inter-type efficiency), 
and the difference between the two frontiers (catch-up component). The cooperatives, on 
average have a lower intra-type efficiency than IOFs. However, the cooperatives, on average 
have a higher catch-up component and a higher inter-type efficiency than IOFs. The 
superiority of the cooperatives in their inter-type efficiency measurement reflects, in addition 
to the physical productivity, the marketing efficiency as a result of normalizing the outputs 
and inputs, of cooperatives and IOFs, with the same price indices. 
The catch-up term differs across countries. This is explained by differences in 
cooperatives characteristics and market condition which imply differences in the internal 
incentives. In Ireland the superiority of the cooperatives’ technology compared to IOFs is the 
highest which is explained by the fact that Irish cooperatives legal entity is that of a public 
limited company, by the fragmented nature of the Irish processing sector and by the proximity 
to the British market. Seven IOFs are the exceptional ones with catch up component equal to 
unity. They have a larger turnover and quantity of raw materials, and smaller fixed assets and 
labor than the other IOFs. Moreover, these seven IOFs are not only the most efficient if 
compared to their own technology, they also have the highest output elasticities in terms of 
fixed assets and raw material and the least decreasing returning to scale production 
technology. Other IOFs would benefit from  reviewing the characteristics of these seven IOFs 
and improving their own technical efficiency with respect to the technology of the IOFs and 
the technology of the cooperatives. The cooperatives’ superiority has a strong impact on the 
future dairy market structure, i.e. cooperatives may increase their market share in the near 
future at the cost of IOFs. In Denmark, cooperatives already account for 97 percent of the 
total milk production.  
Future research would benefit from data on the composition of outputs in the dairy 
processing firms analyzed in this study. Having this information would allow for a better 
representation of heterogeneity attributable to output composition. At present, the currently 
available data do not allow for investigating this. Also, future research should focus on 
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analyzing the socio-economic and environmental factors that explain differences in 
inefficiency between dairy processing companies.   
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Abstract 
 
 
Relevant performance measurements should consider the firm’s objectives. Cooperatives 
objectives differ from investors owned firms. This requires different tools to measure their 
performance. Typically, the performance of cooperatives and investor-owned firms is 
compared using the same approach. We compare the performance of dairy cooperative and 
investor-owned firm in major European dairy producing countries implementing a traditional 
input oriented approach viewing both types of firms as cost minimisers, and an alternative 
approach using two hyperbolic models to consider the objectives of cooperatives. 
Cooperatives’ performance differs across the two approaches from being out performed by 
investor-owned firms using the traditional approach to outperforming them when using an 
approach that is in line with the cooperatives’ objective.   
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Input-oriented technical efficiency, overall efficiency hyperbolic efficiency, 
cooperative model, IOF model. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Dairy cooperatives in Europe have played an important role in the dairy processing sector. In 
major dairy producing-countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland, cooperatives 
process more than 85% of the total milk production (Van Bekkum, 1997). However, the 
performance of the cooperative and their ability to function efficiently in competitive and 
global markets in comparison to the investor-owned firms have been long debated in 
literature (see: Soboh et al., 2009). The  debate has been intensified due to major trends in the 
past few decades such as globalization, changes in related policies, international trade 
liberalization and treaties, and changes in consumers’ preferences (Soboh et al., 2009). 
Recently, due to the expected abolishment of the quota system in 2015 and the current 
financial crisis, the debates are intensified on the competitive strength of the cooperatives and 
IOFs, and cooperatives are argued to have more suitable and sustainable organizational 
structure than IOFs (Van Campen, 2009).   
Cooperatives are not easily defined (Hind, 1999) and do not have a standard ownership 
structure like IOFs (Chaddad and Cook, 2004 ). However, there is a general consensus in the 
literature that cooperatives are generally seen as user-controlled, user-owned and user-benefit 
oriented firms (Soboh et al., 2009). In the case of dairy cooperatives, this emphasis on 
members’ control, ownership and benefit to members is reflected in the milk payment to 
members which includes, in addition to milk price, a proportion of the dividends 
(Zwanenberg et al., 1993). The members’ role and objective in their cooperatives is a major 
reason for debating the argument and empirical findings that cooperatives are technically and 
economically inefficient when compared to the IOFs. Those who advocate cooperatives 
model reject this argument and demand a different approach to evaluate the performance of 
the cooperatives empirically. For instance, Van Dijk and Klep (2005) argued that 
cooperatives have double objectives; one of which is to benefit members while the other is to 
healthily function in the competitive market. Additionally, the members’ control on the 
cooperatives investment decisions, makes the cooperatives less willing to be involved in 
risky ventures and therefore more immune to cope with policy changes (Soboh et al., in 
progress) or economical crises (Van Campen, 2009). It is argued, on one hand, that the 
cooperatives are more beneficial to farmers and the rural development than profit maximizing 
IOFs (Chavez, 2003). On the other hand, Hind (1999) argued that the control and ownership 
of members of the cooperative cause cooperatives to be less oriented to value added 
production, less efficient in input use (especially members’ product) and more focused on 
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exploiting economies of scale. Hence, cooperatives are argued to be less technical, scale and 
cost efficient.  
 Theoretically, both arguments of those who advocate the cooperative form of firms 
and those who criticize it, are defendable but hardly disputed. However, empirically- as far as 
we know- there is no concrete evidence of any of the arguments neither for such comparison 
in general nor for the European dairy cooperatives in comparison to their IOFs counterpart in 
particular(see: Soboh et al., 2009). 
In this study, using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we first analyze technical, 
scale and allocative efficiency of dairy processing firms using the traditional efficiency 
techniques. Second we use a hyperbolic approach to dairy cooperatives and IOFs with a 
special emphasis on the role of raw materials (mainly milk deliveries by the farmers) in two 
models. The first model, measures the hyperbolic technical efficiency of the firms, assuming 
they expand output and contract materials and other inputs simultaneously. The second 
model, measures the hyperbolic technical efficiency of the firms assuming they expand both 
output and materials and contract the other inputs. These two hyperbolic measurements 
provide us with alternative approaches to evaluate the technical efficiency taking into account 
the cooperative’s general objective to serve the interests of its members as the major (if not 
the only) suppliers of materials. Subsequently, we use bootstrapping technique to allow for 
statistical inference.   
This chapter uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), outlined in Färe et al. (1994). This 
method was used by many authors to evaluate and to compare the performance of 
cooperatives to IOFs, such as Doucouliagos and Hone (2000); Singh, et al. (2001) and Boyle 
(2004). However, this study contributes to the literature by addressing the nature of the 
cooperative which aims to serve its members, which is done in two ways. First, this study 
provides the first empirical comparison of the technical, scale and allocative efficiency of 
European dairy cooperatives and IOFs. The results of large IOFs and cooperatives are 
presented in more detail. Second, this chapter presents an alternative approach to measuring 
technical and scale efficiency of cooperatives that explicitly, i.e. an approach that is in line 
with the different objectives of cooperatives versus IOFs. 
The remainder of the chapter is presented as follows. The next section presents the DEA 
models. This is followed by a discussion of the data of the dairy processing firms. In section 
four we present the results of the DEA models. The conclusion is provided in the fifth 
section. 
 
  92 
5.2 DEA Models for Modeling Efficiency of Firms  
 
The performance of dairy cooperatives in comparison to IOFs has been studied by others 
using DEA. Doucouliagos and Hone (2000) used DEA to assess the technical efficiency of 
Australian dairy processing firms using data over the period 1969-1996. Their results show a 
modest technical progress and indicate some convergence in productivity levels across 
regions. They conclude that the Australian dairy sector is operating at a high level of technical 
efficiency. Singh, et al.(2001) applied DEA to compare the performance of the dairy 
cooperatives to the private sector in India. They concluded that cooperatives are more cost 
efficient than IOFs. Boyle (2004) investigated the economic efficiency of Irish dairy 
cooperatives over the period 1961-1987. He argued that cooperatives are not efficient for two 
reasons: (a) cooperatives suffer from technical inefficiency because of principal-agent 
problems and allocation inefficiency due to horizon problems; (b) cooperatives prices for raw 
milk are inefficient. Each of the above studies used the same approach on cooperatives and 
IOFs to measure and compare their performance.   
In this study we use two different approaches to evaluate the performance of the 
cooperatives. The first is the traditional, measuring the overall efficiency of the firms and 
decomposing its input oriented technical, scale and allocative efficiency. The traditional 
approach views the firms as cost minimisers and ignores the different nature of cooperatives 
and IOFs. The second is the alternative approach,  measuring technical efficiency of the firms, 
assuming that firms expand output(s) and materials and simultaneously contract other inputs 
with equal proportions. 
  
5.2.1 Traditional Efficiency Approach and Models 
  
In this approach we measure the input-oriented technical, scale and allocative efficiency. The 
models view the cooperatives and the IOFs as cost minimizing firms, in which all inputs 
(including the materials) are being contracted.   
The input-oriented technical efficiency, in which inputs and materials are contracted 
while keeping output at fixed level, is expected to be higher for IOFs than for the 
cooperatives. For the IOFs, as owners are solely interested in profit, materials (mainly raw 
milk) are considered to be a regular input, while materials for the cooperatives are more 
complex and are not viewed as simply an input since the suppliers of raw milk are themselves 
the owners. The owners of the cooperatives, the suppliers of raw milk, aim to maximize their 
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return by obtaining a high payment for raw materials while at the same time- like other firms- 
want cost minimization for all other inputs and production factors. Therefore, the cooperatives 
are expected to have a lower value of the input-oriented technical efficiency.  
The scale efficiency of the cooperatives is expected to be lower than that of the IOFs. 
The cooperatives are not totally free in choosing their scale of operations, by default they are 
obliged to process and market all members’ production. IOFs on the other hand choose the 
optimal scale to process the quantity of material that maximizes their profit.  
The average allocative efficiency of the cooperatives is expected to be lower than of 
the IOFs. cooperatives are not assumed to be profit maximizers or cost minimizers; instead, 
they aim to minimize a different objective function which aims to pay a higher milk price than 
the IOFs, in addition to minimizing all other costs. And since IOFs are profit maximizers, 
hence cost minimisers as well, they are expected to have a higher value of the allocative 
efficiency (equal to one), while cooperatives, as they are not cost minimisers for their raw 
material, are expected to have lower allocative efficiency than IOFs.   
Before representing the linear programming needed to measure the traditional models, 
to measure the input-oriented technical efficiency and scale and allocative efficiencies, it is 
necessary to introduce some notations.  Consider a firm that uses a vector of inputs (x) and a 
vector of raw material (m) to produce a vector of output (y). 
The DEA input-oriented model to measure the technical efficiency of firms i, i=1,...,N, 
which produces one output using three inputs including the raw material is calculated form 
the following non-linear program: 
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Where vrsφ  is the overall technical efficiency score ])1,0[( ∈φ for the i th firm, Y is the (1×N) 
vector of observed output, M is the (1×N) of observed use of raw material, X is the matrix of 
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observed inputs and λ  is a (Nx1) vector of intensity variables (firm weights). The constraint 
1'1 =λN (with 1N being an Nx1 vector of ones) implies the sum of the lambdas equals one 
and allows for a variable return to scale (VRS) technology. Here, the overall technical 
efficiency measures the minimum proportional contraction in observed inputs (x) and raw 
material (m) subject to the constraints imposed by the observed inputs and the technology. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 line (1). 
To measure the scale efficiency for the two models above, we modify both models to 
exclude the constraint 1'1 =λN 12. This will produce crsφ - input oriented technical efficiency 
assuming constant return to scale- which will be used to measure scale efficiency (SE), which 
equals 
vcrs
crs
φ
φ
. 
The cost efficiency is computed by solving the LP model (2): 
0
1'1
0
0
0
:.
min
,,
≥
=
≥−
≥−
≥+−
+
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
N
Mm
Xx
Yy
ts
mwxw
i
i
i
imix
mx ii
&
&
&&
&&
  
 
where im&  and ix& denote material cost and other inputs quantities, respectively, of the ith firm 
that minimize the cost given the input prices ( xw ) and raw material prices ( mw ). The overall 
efficiency is defined as the ratio of actual to minimum cost: OE (i) =
i
i
C
C&
, where iC is the 
actual cost defined as )( imix mwxw +  and iC&  is the minimum cost which is obtained by 
solving model (2). 
The overall efficiency iOE  of the dairy processing firm is calculated as following: 
iiii AESETEOE ××=                                                                                                              (3) 
In which iTE  is input oriented technical efficiency assuming variable return to scale, iSE  is 
the scale efficiency and iAE is the allocative efficiency of the firm (i).  
                                                 
12
 We don’t write down the models of the constant return to scale here to avoid repetition. 
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5.2.2 Alternative Efficiency Approach and Hyperbolic Models to Incorporate the Nature 
of the Cooperatives 
 
In this alternative approach we consider two hyperbolic models. In the first model, we 
measure the hyperbolic technical efficiency considering the firm radially expands output and 
radially contracts inputs and materials simultaneously with equal proportions; this is presented 
in model 4 which is illustrated in Figure 5.1 with line (4). In the second model, we measure 
the hyperbolic technical efficiency considering an aspect of the cooperatives which aims, not 
only to expand the total turnover, but also materials, while contracting all other input 
simultaneously with equal proportions (see model 5). In the first model (model 4), we view 
each firm (of both types) as an IOF, while in the second model (model 5), we view each firm 
(of both types) as a cooperative. In the rest of this chapter, we will use the term “IOF model” 
when referring to model 4 and “cooperative model” when referring to model 5  
 Our expectation is that, on average, the cooperatives will score lower with the first 
hyperbolic technical efficiency model rather than with the second one. This is due to the 
nature of the cooperatives which is assumed to maximize the revenue of the milk delivered by 
its members (raw milk which makes up the major part of materials).    
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The technical efficiency in which inputs (x) are contracted and both output (y) and raw 
material (m) are simultaneously expanded is measured in the cooperative model (5) and 
illustrated in Figure 5.1 with line (5).  Technical efficiency is expected to be higher for 
cooperatives rather than for IOFs.  
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the three models (the traditional and the two alternative ones), 
that are applied to both types of firms.  For simplification, we use two dimensions: output (y) 
and materials (m). Firm (a) can be either a cooperative or an IOF.  Line (1) in Figure 5.1 
illustrates the traditional situation where material is contracted while output is held fixed. 
Lines (4) and (5) illustrate the two hyperbolic models, where line (4) in Figure 5.1 presents 
the situation where materials is contracted while output is expanded, and line (5) in Figure 5.1 
presents the situation where material and output are expanded. Given the assumed objective 
of cooperatives to pay a high price for inputs delivered by their members (materials), the 
cooperatives are expected to be located further to the right corner, while IOFs are expected to 
be located left upper corner in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: The Direction of the Different Models. 
 
                       Y: total turnover, M: material cost  
 
5.2.3 Bootstrapping Method 
 
The bootstrap method is an established statistical resampling method used to perform 
inference in complex problems. If the data generating process (DGP) characterises the true 
data generation well and is mimicked in the resampling simulation, then the bootstrap method 
is well-performed in validating statistical inference. The bootstrap is mainly to approximate 
the sampling distribution of the estimator (in this study: input-oriented, hyperbolic and scale 
efficiencies). To approximate this sampling distribution we use the empirical distribution of 
the resampled estimate, which is obtained from the Monte Carlo resampling distribution of 
the estimation procedure (in this case the DEA). Repeated re-samples. which are obtained 
from an estimate of the DGP, are used in the estimation procedure to produce repeated 
estimates (Lothgren and Tambour, 1999).  
In this study, we use the bootstrapping method suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) to 
avoid sample biases of the technical and hyperbolic efficiency measurements, and we use the 
bootstrapping approach in Lothgren and Tambour (1999) to correct for data biases when 
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M 
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measuring scale efficiencies. We use Hall-percentile intervals based on differences to 
construct 95% confidence interval for input-oriented and hyperbolic technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency.  
 
5.3 Data  
 
Data on dairy processing firms in six European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands) covering the year 2004 come from AMADEUS13. The 
data set used for estimation consists of 133 firms among which 90 are IOFs and 43 are 
cooperatives.  
The model distinguishes one output (total turnover) and three inputs (fixed assets, 
material cost and employment cost). The outputs and inputs are expressed in Euros of 1996 
(base year) by deflating the monetary values with their Tornqvist price indexes (Coelli et al., 
2005).  
The dairy plants in these countries are typically producing more than one product. 
However, the only relevant output available in the data set is the total turnover. This output 
represents the total operating revenue from selling all products produced by the processing 
company. Turnover (output) is deflated using the countries harmonized index of consumer 
prices for milk, cheese and egg.  
Fixed asset is measured as the value of physical asset such as land, buildings and 
machinery, and the non-physical fixed assets such as the goodwill, patents, brands and market 
shares. The value was deflated using the average value of the prices index of the agricultural 
gross fixed capital formation and the price index of the agricultural machinery and equipment 
per country. 
The AMADEUS data base includes material cost, reflecting the cost of purchasing the 
input materials before the processing operation starts. This input mainly consists of raw milk 
purchased by the dairy plant. We used the deflated EC-index of producer prices of the cows’ 
milk per country as the deflator for the material cost.  Labor cost is deflated using the nominal 
value of the labor cost index in total industries (excluding public administration).  
The price indexes vary over the years and the different countries but not over the firms or 
over their type, implying differences in the composition of inputs and output or quality 
                                                 
13
 AMADEUS is a European financial data base prepared by Bureau van Dijk and contains more than 5 million 
private, cooperative and public companies. The data-base is collected from reports produced by the chamber of 
commerce of the different European countries. AMADEUS unified the figures of the financial statements of the 
different countries. 
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differences are reflected in the quantity (Cox and Wohlgenant, 1986). Additionally, the 
quantities also reflect differences in prices of the production factors between the two types of 
firms; a higher the milk payment implies a higher quantity of materials.  
Table 5.1 provides the means and standard deviations of turnover, fixed assets, raw 
material, labor and prices. It shows that cooperatives have, on average, a higher average value 
of the output and the three inputs than IOFs. 
 
Table 5.1: Description of the Data 
Variable Dimension Mean (n) Standard deviation  
Type  IOFs (90) Cooperatives(43) IOFs cooperatives 
Quantities 
     Output (turnover) 106 Euros 14.37 49.04 47.21 110.39 
     Fixed assets 106 Euros 2.40 9.67 5.80 27.36 
     Materials  106 Euros 9.64 34.64 4.97 94.92 
     Labor 106 Euros 0.28 1.05 0.66 1,52 
Prices 
 Output (turnover) 1996=100 91.83  
     Fixed assets 1996=100 87.54 -- 
    Materials 1996=100 128.59 -- 
    Labor 1996=100 113.14 -- 
 
 
5.4 Results 
 
The results of the DEA models and the bootstrapping measures all were obtained using the 
package FEAR (Wilson, 2008). Section 4.1 presents the results of the traditional approach and 
Section 4.2 presents the alterative approach of the two hyperbolic models.  
 
5.4.1 Results of the Traditional Approach 
 
Results in Table 5.2 show that IOFs, on average, are more technically, scale and allocative 
efficient than cooperatives, hence, more overall efficient. The cooperatives are technically 
less efficient when compared to IOFs, cooperatives are slightly less scale efficient than IOFs, 
and cooperatives are less allocatively efficient than IOFs. Using the traditional approach, in 
which firms are considered to minimize cost (and contract the quantity of materials), 
cooperatives are out-performed by IOFs in their technical, scale and allocative efficiencies. 
Treating the material as an input, which has to be minimized, provides us with an expected 
lower performance of the cooperatives. On average, the input oriented technical efficiency of 
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the IOFs is more than 50 percent higher than the one of the cooperatives. The results of the 
technical efficiency also reflect differences in for example prices paid for raw materials 
between cooperatives and the IOFs, where cooperatives is expected to pay higher total price. 
On average, the scale efficiency of the IOFs, using the traditional approach, is 10 percent 
higher than the one of the cooperatives. This difference in scale efficiency suggests that 
cooperatives are operating on a less optimal size than IOFs. This finding may be due to the 
fact that cooperatives are more restricted in choosing their optimal size due to their obligation 
to process all what members provide to the cooperatives. On average, the allocative efficiency 
of the IOFs is 20 percent higher than the one of the cooperatives. This difference of the 
allocative efficiency suggests that the cooperatives are less successful in minimizing costs 
than IOFs (as assumed to be more of profit oriented firms).  The latter finding suggests that 
cooperatives may have another objective rather than minimizing costs, cooperatives may be 
more interested in paying a high milk price to their farmers.   
These results do confirm the hypothetical expectations of the cooperatives 
performance when compared to the IOFs. The difference of the technical and scale 
efficiencies between the cooperatives and IOFs are statistically significant as their confidence 
intervals do not overlap. Therefore, the overall performance of the cooperatives using the 
traditional model is lower than the IOFs over all efficiency.  
 
Table 5.2: Overall Efficiency and its Decomposition for Cooperatives and IOFs (95% 
Confidence Interval in Parentheses)  
 Technical 
efficiency  
Scale efficiency 
 
Allocative 
efficiency  
Overall 
efficiency  
     
   Coops 0.428 (0.29-0.54) 0.769 (0.71-0.77)  0.416 0.137    
   IOFs 0.642 (0.52-0.71) 0.849 (0.79-0.85)  0.582 0.317    
 
 
5.4.2  Results of the Alternative Approaches  
 
Table 5.3 presents the results of the two hyperbolic efficiency models (i.e. the IOF model and 
the cooperative model). The IOF model expands outputs and contracts materials along with 
other inputs, whereas the cooperative model expands outputs and materials and contracts the 
use of other inputs. 
Results of the IOF model in Table 5.3 show that cooperatives score, on average, 1.659 
which says that cooperatives can increase their output with 65.9 percent and contract their 
  101 
inputs (including materials) by ( )
659.1
11( − *100 = ) 39.7 percent in order to end up at the 
frontier IOFs and cooperatives have in common. The IOFs, on the other hand, scored on 
average 1.430 in the IOF model (model 4), which says that the IOFs can expand their output 
with 43 percent and contract their inputs with 30.1 percent in order to end up at the frontier 
IOFs and cooperatives have in common. 
cooperatives score slightly higher in the cooperative model (model 5) than the IOF 
model with 1.638, which says that cooperatives can on average expand output and materials 
by 63,8 percent and decrease the use of inputs (excluding materials) by ( )
638.1
11( − *100 =) 
39.0 percent efficient in contracting their input (excluding materials). The IOFs score worse in 
the cooperative model rather than in the IOF model with 1,647, which implies a potential for 
expansion of outputs and materials by 64,7 percent their and a 39.3 percent contraction of 
inputs (excluding materials). When moving from the IOF to the cooperative model, the scale 
efficiency has also improved for the cooperatives (from 1.21 to 1.10) while it has worsened 
marginally for the IOFs (from 1.09 to 1.10).   
The results of the bootstrapping show that all differences in technical and scale 
between cooperatives and the IOFs are not significant at the critical 5% level in the IOF and 
cooperative models. In the IOF model, the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of the 
cooperative (1.659) and (1,21) lie within the confidence interval of the hyperbolic technical 
and scale efficiencies of the IOFs [1,14-1,74] and [0,89- 1,97], respectively. The situation is 
similar for the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of the IOFs (1,430) and (1,091) 
which are also located within the cooperatives confidence interval for both measurements 
[1,21-1,92] and [0,88-1,47], respectively. The bootstrapping results of the cooperative model 
(model 5) are similar to the results of the IOF model in terms of location within the 
confidence intervals. The hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of cooperatives (1.638) 
and (1,10) lie within the confidence interval of the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies 
of the IOFs [1,03-1,97] and [0,73- 1,43], respectively. The situation is similar for the 
hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of the IOFs (1,647) and (1,10) which are also 
located within the cooperatives confidence interval for both measurements [1,09-2,61] and 
[0,73-1,43], respectively.   
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Table 5.3: Hyperbolic Technical and Scale Efficiencies of Cooperatives and IOFs (95% 
Confidence Interval in Parentheses)  
 
 
IOF Model in (4): Contract Materials Cooperative Model in (5): Expand 
Materials 
 Technical 
Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
 
Technical 
Efficiency  Scale Efficiency  
Cooperatives 1.659 (1,21-1,92) 1,21 (0.88-1,47) 1.638 (1.09-2,61) 1,10 (0,73-1,43) 
IOFs 1.430 (1,14-1,74) 1,091 (0,89-1,43) 1.647 (1,03-1,97) 1,10 (0.89-1,48) 
 
Although the difference of the measures between the two is not significant at the 
critical 5% level, it shows that the performance of the cooperatives improved by 8 percent 
while the IOFs performance is worsened by 17 percent when moving from a model that 
contracts materials to a model that expands materials. This change of the performances 
between the two models, suggest that cooperatives are more oriented to increasing material 
costs (e.g. through a higher price), whereas IOFs are more focused on decreasing material 
costs.  Additionally, the difference of the scale efficiency between the cooperatives and the 
IOFs reduced to zero in the second model, which implies that cooperatives are more scale 
efficient when materials and output are expanded rather than when the cooperatives expand 
only the output while contracting materials and other inputs.  
 
5.4.3 Performance of the Largest Cooperatives and IOFs 
 
In Appendix 5A, we present the results of the ten largest cooperatives and IOFs in terms of 
turnover. Arla and Friesland are the only two cooperatives which are technically efficient 
using the traditional and both alternative approaches. Campina and Glanbia are only 
technically efficient using the traditional model, while Nordmilch is technically efficient in 
both hyperbolic models (IOF and cooperative models). 
Results in Appendix 5A show that the scale efficiency of the largest cooperatives is rather 
poor in both the traditional model and the IOF model, and improved significantly using the 
cooperative model. Nordmilch and Arla are the only two cooperatives that are scale efficient 
in the cooperative model. However, Friesland and Campina are the least scale efficient using 
the traditional model and the IOF model. The average improvement of the scale efficiency 
from the IOF to the cooperative model is 19 percent for the ten largest cooperatives and only 
three percent for the ten largest IOFs. 
 The allocative efficiency of the cooperatives is generally very low, which suggests that 
the objective of large cooperatives differs from the objective of large IOFs. Among the ten 
largest IOFs, there are five IOFs technically efficient using the traditional model. The number 
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of technically efficient IOFs drops dramatically (to two IOFs) when measured using the 
cooperative model; this drop in the number of efficient IOFs in the cooperative model is in 
line with the finding in section 3.2 which showed that IOFs perform worse in the cooperative 
model rather than in the traditional and IOF models. More details can be viewed from the 
Appendix. 
     
5.5 Conclusions 
 
The raison d’etre of cooperatives differs from the one of IOFs. Therefore in order to evaluate 
the efficiency of the cooperatives, a different approach should be considered namely an 
approach that takes into account the different objectives of the owners of the cooperative. 
Comparing the performance of cooperatives to the one of the IOFs using the same model 
imposes the same behavioral characteristic on either type of firm. cooperatives, as user-
owned, user-controlled and user beneficiary firms, are more restricted to members’ interest in 
processing their own production and receiving the highest overall payment for their product 
which serves as the material to the cooperative. Therefore, materials have a different role for 
cooperatives rather than for IOFs. The role of material in cooperatives influences the choice 
of the input bundle by the cooperative firm to produce output, restricts the choice of the 
optimal size and implies a deviation from cost minimizing behavior. 
Our empirical findings show that, on average, the cooperatives under-perform the IOFs in 
their input-oriented technical, scale, allocative efficiencies.  However, the performance of the 
cooperatives in comparison to the IOFs improved when considering the model that expands 
the use of materials and output. Additionally, the differences in the scale efficiencies between 
cooperatives and IOFs disappear. The improvement of technical efficiency and the 
disappearance of the difference in scale efficiency suggest that materials have different roles 
in cooperatives and IOFs due to different objectives of the two firm types.    
To provide a relevant comparison of the performance of the cooperatives with the IOFs’ 
analysts should incorporate the interest of the owners of the firm. The overall conclusion is 
that cooperatives and IOFs need different tools to evaluate their performances, comparing the 
performance of the cooperatives to IOFs is not suitable if the same approach is used 
assuming same objectives to both. 
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Appendix 5A: The Results of the 10 Largest cooperatives and IOFs  
 Traditional Models 1-3 IOF Model  Cooperative  
Model  
Name TE  SE AE TE SE TE SE 
Coop         
Arla Foods A.M.B.A. 
1.00 0.68 0.12 1.00 1.21 1.00 1.00 
Koninklijke Friesland 
Foods N.V.14 
1.00 0.39 0.14 1.00 1.60 1.00 1.06 
Zuivel Coöperatie 
Campina U.A.. 
1.00 0.40 0.18 1.07 1.60 1.06 1.11 
Nordmilch E.G. 0.87 0.51 0.12 1.00 1.41 1.00 1.00 
Glanbia P.L.C.  1.00 0.61 0.55 1.55 1.33 1.59 1.18 
Candia (CEDILAC) 0.44 0.45 0.75 1.48 1.53 2.04 1.20 
Belgomilk 0.31 0.65 0.64 1.73 1.30 1.87 1.16 
3A SA 0.58 0.55 0.62 1.27 1.39 1.49 1.17 
Sodiaal International  0.44 0.70 0.48 1.49 1.22 1.50 1.12 
Drentsoverijsselse 
Coöperatie Kaas BA. 
0.24 0.68 0.51 1.91 1.29 1.88 1.13 
IOF        
Cogesal Miko 1.00 0.64 0.54 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.24 
Danone SA 0.39 0.27 0.74 1.00 1.93 1.59 1.33 
SAS Entremont 
Alliance 
1.00 0.46 0.49 1.00 1.47 1.25 1.41 
Nestle Produits 
Laitiers Frais 
1.00 0.69 0.61 1.00 1.21 1.00 1.31 
S.A. Corman 0.84 0.51 0.30 1.08 1.42 1.99 1.31 
Goldsteigkasereien 
Bayernwald GMBH 
0.74 0.69 0.24 1.13 1.23 1.21 1.36 
SA Ingredia 1.00 0.55 0.60 1.00 1.36 1.75 1.22 
Glaces Thiriet 0.66 0.73 0.54 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.26 
SAS Laiterie Du Val 
D’Ancenis  
0.71 0.64 0.63 1.14 1.30 1.47 1.22 
Molkerei-Laiterie 
Walhorn 
1.00 0.81 0.77 1.00 1.11 1.02 1.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 It is owned 100 percent by the cooperative Friesland.  
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The central topic of this study is to measure performance and to conduct a comparative analysis 
of the cooperatives and IOFs in the dairy industries of major European countries. This objective 
was approached by first highlighting the gap between the empirical and theoretical literature on 
cooperatives performance; second by providing empirical evidence of differences in the 
financial characteristics between cooperatives and IOFs; thirdly by comparing technologies and 
technical efficiencies of the cooperatives in comparison to the IOFs; and finally by proposing a 
performance measurement which takes into account the nature of the cooperative as a 
distinguished type of firm. Cooperative firms are distinguished in the relation to their member-
owners who are not only the main users of their services or products, but they also control the 
firms’ management and therefore are the main beneficiaries. Cooperatives are diverse in their 
ownership structure and financing mechanisms and do not have a standard form to be 
generalized to represent all different cooperatives (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). However 
diverse, cooperatives are still distinguished from the investor-owned firm  in the role of 
members- users- within the cooperatives as owners, controllers and benefiters and therefore 
risk takers (Staatz, 1989). Therefore, in order to provide a relevant comparison of the 
performance cooperatives and IOFs, members’ objectives should be taken into account. 
Section two discusses the theoretical issues with regards to the differences with the 
investor-owned firms. The third section discusses the data and methodological issues, which is 
followed by the discussion of the empirical results and future research. Finally, the main 
conclusions of the study are presented. 
 
 
 
  108 
6.2  Theoretical Issues  
 
To compare the performance of dairy cooperatives with IOFs, it is crucial to understand the 
theoretical models of the cooperative and the IOF.     
Cooperatives differ from IOFs both in their structure and orientation. Additionally, the 
cooperative firm is not easily defined nor does  any standard form of cooperative firm exist. 
Cooperatives are very much heterogeneous in terms of origin, purpose and ownership structure, 
which makes it hard to provide a performance measurement that applies to all cooperatives. 
Defined differences will result in differences in the general objective of the cooperatives to be 
taken into account in  performance measurement. However, there is general consensus that 
cooperatives are member-oriented in the sense that members control the cooperative and are 
responsible for the capitalization of the cooperative firm. Cooperative business is all about 
members ‘who own, control and have the benefit from the cooperative as they are the main 
users. Cooperatives are to be seen as double layered enterprises (Van Dijk and Klep, 2005).  
Economists and financial analysts who studied the performance of cooperatives 
assigned different objectives (see chapter 2 for details). Studies assuming a single objective of 
the cooperative view the cooperative either as a form of vertical integration, an independent 
form comparable to the IOFs or as a variant form of firms from the IOFs. Studies that assume 
multiple objectives view the cooperative as coalition of otherwise independent firms.  The fact 
that cooperatives have a different objective than maximising return to shareholders should lead 
to the conclusion that cooperatives are non-profit organizations. Cooperatives are member 
oriented and seek profit and market growth in a comparable way to the profit seeking firms. 
Yet they do not strive for profit maximization as do IOFs. Cooperatives have a dual purpose: to 
maximize price in the long run for their members and to be successful as a firm. The fact that 
there are different suggested objective(s) for cooperatives, implies that there is debate on 
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whether the differences in the institution between the cooperative and the IOFs results in 
different patterns of the financial characteristics and therefore require different approaches and 
tools when measuring performance. Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence of the influence of 
the institutional differences on financial ratios; chapter 4 investigates whether cooperatives and 
IOFs have different production technologies and chapter 5 provides an alternative approach to 
measuring the performance of cooperatives in order to address the nature of cooperatives. I am 
aware that ideally we should include  the views of the firm as a form of vertical integration or 
as a coalition of independent firms and also to explicitly consider multiple objectives. 
Unfortunately this is not realistic and a choice had to be made - also the quality of the available 
data and  methodological issues limited our ability to consider these other views.   
 
6.3 Data and Methodological Issues 
 
In this section, I discuss the data and methodological issues, since in my view the available data 
at my disposal was very much determining the direction of the methodological approaches used 
in this study. This discussion tackles each issue encountered in this thesis by describing their 
consequences, presenting my way in addressing them and discussing potential improvements in 
terms of methodological approaches in case better data is available.     
 
6.3.1 Data Issues 
 
In this study,  I used the AMADEUS database, which was the only source of data at my 
disposal, to measure and compare the financial performance of cooperatives and IOFs in 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. The data issues of this 
study are: the standardization of the variables across observations and the details provided per 
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observation. This section discusses the standardization of AMADEUS, which is a European 
data base that combines accounting and financial information from the chambers of 
commerce of 30 European countries.  
Standardizing the information from different European countries was crucial and provided us 
with the ability to draw conclusions about the performance of the different firms across 
countries. As any data standardization criteria, AMADEUS  achieved uniformity and 
integration of the information and it allowed for managing the complexity of the different 
information and accounting systems (Jacucci et al., 2003) across the six mentioned EU 
countries. Our choice of these six countries was mainly based on the importance of milk 
production in these countries but also on the availability of the data. Data from several 
countries, in particular eastern and southern European countries, have many missing values. 
AMADEUS imposed its standard measurements on heterogeneous measurements that are 
based on different accounting systems (mainly Anglophone and Francophone) across 
countries.  Accounting data depend on specific national budgeting rules and practices, which 
cannot be harmonized internationally without providing inconsistent information. Imposing 
the standardized AMADEUS measures result in errors in measurement like what item to be 
included under terms such equity, profit, debt, etc. Also, imposing standardized measurements 
produces biased results, i.e. differences in results between countries may reflect differences in 
accounting systems.  However, as we mainly aim to compare the performance of cooperatives 
with IOFs, knowing that within each country both types of firms are faced with the same 
accounting regulations, the issue of errors in the standardizing way of AMADEUS was not a 
major concern. Moreover, in order to deal with the lack of across-country uniformity, I 
included dummy variables to tackle any country specific conditions (Chapter 3). 
AMADEUS defines the firm’s type by taking the definition as it is stated by each country 
(or chamber of commerce). This leaves the researcher in confusion when not familiar with the 
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essence of the definitions of the cooperative firms across countries. The categorization of 
firms differs across countries, as AMADEUS does not solely distinguish two ownership 
categories (for instance cooperatives from IOFs), but several legal categories. A good 
example are the Limited liability company in the Netherlands:  the BV and the NV. Both are 
usually an IOF in the Netherlands, while family businesses and stock listed companies are not 
distinguished. In this study, I made my own categorizations by combining the information of 
AMADEUS with the information I obtained by either checking all the existing websites of the 
firms or by contacting the firms directly. This combination of information establishes more 
confidence in the definition of the type of firm that was used in this study.  
Next, I discuss the details provided per observation in AMADEUS. More details in 
terms of turnover, shareholders-funds, materials and labor would have enabled me to conduct 
further analysis (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and to explain the efficiency results (Chapters 4- 5).   
More details on the turnover compositions, in terms of dairy and non dairy related activities, 
would have enabled me to analyze in terms of studying the performance according to the 
composition of turnover. The total turnover of the dairy sector is generated by different types 
of products (both dairy and non-dairy) with different values and market conditions. Firms 
producing a single product will produce at a larger scale and may reap the benefits of 
economies of scale. On the other hand, firms that diversify in several products may have cost 
savings (economies of scope) in case some inputs are used for multiple production processes. 
Thus, the performance of the firm (conducted in Chapters 4 and 5) should vary according to 
the compositions of turnover. Also, AMADEUS imports the classification of the sector of 
firms from its original source. For instance, firms can be defined as dairy firms although a 
large proportion (in few cases the largest proportion) of its turnover is from non-dairy 
production, for example from chocolates, sweets, and fruits drinks. By contacting firms and 
obtaining information from all the existing firms’ websites about the major activities, in 
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combination with information from AMADEUS, we improved the AMADEUS sector 
classification15 by removing few firms which have major non-dairy activities, such as Nestle 
in the Netherlands. 
Having more quantitative details on the shareholders’ groups and the type of their funds, 
materials compositions, and labor would have allowed me to conduct provide a more in-depth 
analysis of the firm classification (Chapter 3) a second stage regression to explain the 
efficiency results. Details on the shareholders group such as membership, age and origin of 
the shareholders, if available, would provide a better understanding of technical efficiency 
(Chapters 4 and 5) and the characteristics of the classified firms (Chapter 3). Additionally, 
having quantitative information on the shareholders and the type of their funds (allocative or 
non allocative) would have allowed for a comparison of the performance of the cooperatives 
from the perspective of shareholders with potentially conflicting interests (for instance 
members who own large farms versus members who own small farms, old versus young 
members, or members versus non-members shareholders). It is important to mention here that 
cooperatives rarely have shareholders in the same manner IOFs have. AMADEUS refers to 
the capital ownership of both types as shareholders fund. Apart from Ireland, cooperatives in 
the countries included in this study are mainly not stock listed (Van Bekkum, 1997), which 
suggests that non-member shareholders are not significant contributors in financing dairy 
cooperatives. Only in Ireland the capital of the cooperatives is proportionally stock listed. 
However, the characteristics of the shareholders fund is not the same for all cooperatives in 
other countries. For instance, (former) Friesland issued two types of shares for members, 
(former) Campina issues members’ certificate, and ARLA has unallocated members shares. 
All the above differences were reported by AMADEUS as shareholders fund.  However, 
information on the type of shareholders’ funds, i.e. allocative or non-allocative would for sure 
                                                 
15
 Only less than 1 percent of the total number of firms that are classified as dairy firm by AMADEUS raised the 
concern of large proportion (more than 50 percent) of non-dairy turnover composition and they were removed at 
early stage for the sack of consistency. 
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take this study a step ahead. In the same way, having more quantitative details on the 
composition of materials and labor is helpful in explaining the results in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Although, raw milk is the major component of materials in the dairy processing industry 
which may justify my choice to address the raw milk by materials, it should be acknowledged 
that dairy production involves other materials particularly for producing high value added 
dairy products. Details on the type and quality of labor is also relevant in the measurement 
and comparison of performance. The contribution of skilled labor to performance most likely 
differs from the contribution of the unskilled one; the same goes for part-time versus full-time 
labor. Having information on the separate labor categories would have allowed a deeper 
analysis of the causes of differences in performance. 
 
6.3.2 Methodological Issues 
 
In this study, I had to make choices in terms of methods in implementing the objective of this 
study. These choices were based on the objective of the study and on the availability of data. 
In the following, I analyze my choices and provide an overview of the possible alternatives 
and modifications, baring in mind the objective of this study and the quality of the data.  
The first methodological issue was about applying statistical approaches and 
econometrics in the study rather than using different financial ratios. This issue was related to 
two matters: a) how to describe the pattern of the cooperatives’ financial characteristics as 
distinguished from IOFs (Chapter 3); b) and how to precisely measure and compare the 
performance of cooperatives and IOFs in several countries (Chapters 4 and 5). Although 
financial ratio analysis provides insights in the first matter, these insights are partial. 
Econometric techniques (e.g. logistic regression) allows for addressing the multivariate nature 
of the problem of analyzing differences in financial characteristics between IOFs and 
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cooperatives. Logistic regression is the optimal technique when the issue is to predict the type 
of firm based on different financial aspects (Van der Lans, 2009). There are some concerns, 
though, whether this is the ideal technique for giving a description of financial ratios that 
differentiate the cooperative from the IOF. In comparison with discriminant analysis, logistic 
regression is more robust and efficient in terms of data requirement as was explained in 
Chapter 2.  Applying the technique to each country separately produces results reflecting 
more clearly the contribution of each aspect to separating IOFs from cooperatives per country. 
However, this approach produces weak and meaningless results because of the limited 
number of observations for some countries (e.g. the Netherlands) Instead, it produces low 
pseudo-R values which reflects failure in achieving stable and meaningful results (Dufty, 
2007). This thesis used country dummies to control for country differences.  
In Chapters 4 and 5 we use parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis - SFA) and non-
parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis - DEA) efficiency techniques, respectively. In the 
case of DEA no restrictive assumptions about the functional form and distribution of 
efficiency have to be made. However, DEA confounds stochastic events and errors in the data 
with inefficiency. A main advantage of the SFA technique is the possibility it offers for a 
richer specification. It also allows for (among other things) a formal statistical testing of 
hypotheses and the construction of confidence intervals for the parameters. Whereas a 
statistical stochastic approach may seem most attractive, it also implies that the frontier has 
generated all data (see Schmidt, 1985) The choice of these techniques depends on tradeoffs 
related to the purpose of the study, type of data and technology characteristics. Differences 
exist between these techniques in terms of the magnitude of the efficiency scores and the level 
of scale efficiency. However, generally the efficiency ranking of units does not vary much 
(Hjalmarsson et al.,1996). In Chapter 4, we used separate stochastic frontiers for each firm 
type. The main purpose is to provide a comparison of the production technologies of these 
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two types, additionally to provide a measurement of the technical efficiency of each type with 
respect to its own frontier (intra type). The production frontiers significantly differ between 
the two types and it was also found that the cooperatives technology is superior to that of 
IOFs. Introducing a hyperbolic measurement (termed as cooperative model), which allows for 
expanding the materials (i.e. mainly raw milk provided by members in case of the 
cooperatives), shows that the relative performance of cooperatives to IOFs has improved 
compared to the traditional technical measurements and the model that contracts milk and 
other inputs (termed as IOF model). In Chapters 4 and 5 we use cross sectional type of data 
and conducted a static approach. An alternative would be to use the panel nature of the data 
and implementing dynamic efficiency approaches. Using panel data in our techniques has 
many advantages in terms of better inference of the model parameters, greater capacity to 
capture the complexity of firms behavior (Hsiao, 2003) and comparing trends over time (Yee 
and Niemeier, 1996).  However,  we missed the necessary data to use the panel data nature 
efficiently (see data section). Dynamic approaches (both parametric (such as in: Battese and 
Coelli, 1992 and Desli, Ray and Kumbhakar 200316) and non-parametric (such as in: Nemoto 
and Goto, 1999)) require good quality panel data. Dynamic efficiency approaches are able to 
accommodate the long-term behavior of firms and the adjustment of their efficiency score 
across years. This ability of the dynamic approaches is accompanied by high complexity in 
modeling and the requirement of making strong assumptions related to future prices of inputs 
and outputs. The complexity in modeling, strong assumptions about future prices and the 
difficulty in obtaining high quality panel data make applying dynamic approaches less 
preferable in this study. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Although in several occasions the approaches of these two literatures are referred to as dynamical approaches 
they are time variant efficiency approaches.  
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6.4 Empirical Issues and Results 
 
Two empirical issues are to be discussed here; the first is related to the gap between the 
empirical and theoretical literature which was highlighted in Chapter 2 and the second is 
related to the integration of the chapters. In Chapter 2, we found that the highest number of 
the empirical applications viewed the cooperatives as an independent firm and compare its 
performance from the perspective of shareholders. This finding indicates that for many 
empirical economists it is  ambiguous whether differences in orientation between cooperatives 
and IOFs result in differences in financial performance or whether different approaches to 
measure and compare performances should be implemented. The results of this study 
provided empirical evidence of differences in financial ratios (Chapter 3) and alternative 
performance measurements (Chapters 4 and 5). This study contributed to narrowing the gap 
between the empirical and theoretical literatures by approaching the performance of 
cooperatives separately from IOFs to compare differences of technologies (Chapter 4) and by 
providing alternative measurements of technical performance to address the differences in 
objectives between cooperatives and IOFs (Chapter 5).   
The second empirical issue is related to the integration of the chapters. Chapter 3 
presents empirical evidence of differences in financial characteristics between cooperatives, 
which are members’ oriented, and IOFs, which are investors’ oriented. This empirical 
evidence is relevant for academics, all stakeholders of the dairy sector and policy makers. The 
cooperatives were found to be less profitable than IOFs, which can be a consequence of either 
less profitable products, having a higher cost or having higher operational efficiency. Material 
costs are higher for cooperatives than IOFs. The operational efficiency, however, is found to 
be higher for cooperatives since cooperatives have a higher ratio of turnover to fixed assets. 
These insights can be used for recognizing financial strengths and weaknesses of members’ 
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oriented firms in fulfilling members’ objectives and in facing policy changes and financial 
distress in comparison to investors’ oriented firms. Chapter 4 investigates whether differences 
in technologies between cooperatives and IOFs exist. Furthermore, this chapter measures the 
technical efficiencies relative to the two technologies. The results showed that cooperatives 
have a more productive technology and when compared to their own technologies, they are 
slightly less efficient. Differences in production technology and technical efficiencies exist 
across the different countries reflecting characteristics of the local markets and characteristics 
of the firms. Although the operational scale of cooperatives is much larger than that of IOFs, 
both type of firms are characterized by decreasing returns to scale.  The results of this chapter 
provided the insight that cooperatives differ in their production technologies. All these 
differences promote the need to introduce different approaches in measuring and comparing 
the efficiency of cooperatives to IOFs.  
Acknowledging the fact that for cooperative materials are not just a factor of 
production, but more specifically the products of members (who are also owners), Chapter 5 
introduces an alternative approach to comparing the technical efficiency. The results showed 
that if materials were treated as input to be contracted, the technical efficiency of cooperatives 
would be underestimated. The results of chapter 5 support the findings in chapter 3 that the 
cost of materials are higher for cooperatives than for IOFs.  
The results of Chapter 4 showed higher average technical efficiencies of both types of firms 
than the results of Chapter 5.  This is explained by the empirical evidence that non-parametric 
methods usually produce smaller values of technical efficiency than parametric ones 
(Hjalmarsson et al.,1996).   
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6.5 Main Conclusions 
In the following, I provide the main conclusion of this study. These are related to the main 
results of each chapter and to the implications of the study as whole. 
 
i) There is a gap between what theoretically has been developed and what empirically 
has been implemented in terms of measuring and comparing the performance of agricultural 
cooperatives and IOF’s. Among the reasons for this gap is the difficulty in finding and getting 
access to relevant data (Chapter 2). 
 
ii) In the existing literature, the members’ objectives are ignored when the performance 
of cooperatives is measured or compared with the performance of IOFs (Chapter 2).   
 
iii) Cooperatives differ significantly from IOFs in terms of  the pattern of key financial 
ratios. It may be assumed that this is due to the orientation of cooperatives towards members  
(Chapter 3).  
 
iv) Dairy cooperatives are more homogenous in terms of their financial ratios than dairy 
IOFs in the six EU countries analyzed (Chapter 3).   
 
v) Drawing conclusions about the technical performance of cooperatives vis-à-vis IOFs 
can be misleading if both types are compared to the same production frontier (Chapter 4). 
 
vi) The production technology of cooperatives is mostly superior to the production 
technology of IOFs (Chapter 4). 
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vii) The technical efficiency of IOFs is decreasing if assessed using the cooperative model 
rather than the IOF model (Chapter 5). 
 
viii) The cost of materials is minimized by IOFs which is not necessarily the case for 
cooperatives.  (Chapter 5). 
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Summary  
 
Cooperatives are member-user oriented firms and have different objectives than IOFs. 
However, when comparing and measuring their performance, the empirical literature usually 
treats cooperatives as if they were investor-owned firms. Performance measurement for 
cooperatives, where their orientation towards their members is incorporated, is missing. 
Additionally, for the European dairy sector,  empirical evidence that the different orientation 
of the cooperatives results in different financial characteristics is lacking.    
This thesis aims to measure and compare the performance of cooperatives to IOFs as 
two types of firms with two different orientations. This study provides an extensive literature 
review of the theoretical and empirical literature. Additionally, this study uses econometric 
techniques to provide empirical evidence of the financial characteristics of cooperatives that 
distinguish them from IOFs in the dairy sector and to measure and compare the performance 
of cooperatives in terms of technical and economical efficiencies in a way that addresses the 
objectives of cooperatives. The empirical applications of this study focus on dairy processing 
firms in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
An extensive list of studies exists on measurement and comparison of the performance 
of cooperatives and IOFs. Chapter 2 proposes classifications of the theoretical and the 
empirical literature and highlights the gap between the two streams of literature. The 
classification of the theoretical literature integrates three views on cooperatives: a vertical 
integration of firms, independent enterprise and coalition of firms. Chapter 2 presents several 
formal models of the economical behavior of cooperatives; some assume single and others 
multiple objectives. The empirical literature is classified into two categories, studies based on 
economic theory and studies that use accounting techniques. Both of these categories failed to 
address the characteristic of the cooperatives as member oriented. Instead they predominantly 
viewed the cooperatives as if they were investor-owned firms.  
Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence of the differences in financial characteristics of 
cooperatives and IOFs in the dairy industry of several European countries. It is assumed that 
the difference in orientation between cooperatives (as members oriented) and IOFs (as 
investor-owned) results in different financial characteristics. This chapter uses logistic 
regression to describe the differences in several indicators such as profitability, debt, 
operational efficiency, equity growth, size and country dummies (accounting for across 
country differences). These differences of the cooperatives’ orientation produce differences in 
patterns of financial ratios as cooperatives are found to be less profitable, have higher material 
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costs, operate more efficiently, and have a stronger financial position in terms of total debt 
than IOFs. Differences across countries, however were not significant in distinguishing 
cooperatives from IOF. The indicators have a larger variance for cooperatives than IOFs, 
suggesting that cooperatives are more heterogeneous than IOFs in their financial indicators. 
As a conclusion, cooperatives differ in several financial ratios, especially in terms of their 
financial position. They are expected to be better equipped to face future challenges of the 
dairy sector.   
As cooperatives differ from IOFs in their orientation, technical efficiency is analyzed in 
Chapter 4 using different production frontiers. The approach that is adopted allows for 
measuring technical efficiency of the firm with respect to its own type specific frontier (called 
intra-type efficiency) and for measuring the catch-up component which reflects the difference 
between the frontiers of cooperatives and IOFs. As results show, the difference between the 
production frontiers of cooperatives and IOFs is statistically significant. This implies that 
using a pooled frontier for measuring technical efficiency is misleading as cooperatives have a 
more productive technology, which also reflects a higher marketing efficiency than IOFs in 
the dairy processing industry. On the other hand, cooperatives are slightly less efficient than 
IOFs relative to their own frontier. Although the scale of operation is much higher for 
cooperatives than for IOFs, both types of firms are characterized by their decreasing returns to 
scale.  
Chapter 5 measures and compares the overall efficiency of cooperatives and IOFs in the dairy 
processing industry. The overall efficiency is decomposed into allocative, technical and scale 
efficiencies assuming cost minimization behavior for all firms. Furthermore, two alternative 
hyperbolic efficiency measures were implemented. The first hyperbolic measurement (the 
IOF model) assumes that firms expand output and contract all inputs, while the second (the 
cooperative model) addresses the different objectives of cooperatives by assuming that firms 
expand output and materials and contract all other inputs. The results show that the technical 
efficiency of IOFs decreases when applying the cooperative model rather than the IOF model, 
whereas the technical efficiency of cooperatives remains the same. This chapter provides 
evidence that a relevant performance comparison between cooperatives and IOFs has to 
incorporate the relation of the owners to their firm. 
The difference in orientation of the cooperatives results in differences in financial 
characteristics between cooperatives and IOFs. Measuring the performance of cooperatives 
(as members oriented firms) as if they were IOFs is misleading. Accounting for the members 
objectives is crucial in measuring the performance of cooperatives.  
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Samenvatting 
 
In coöperatieve ondernemingen staan transacties met de leden centraal. Coöperaties hebben 
daarom  andere doelstellingen dan aandeelhouder-georiënteerde ondernemingen (investor- 
owned firms of IOFs). Echter, de bestaande literatuur die de prestaties van coöperaties 
vergelijkt met die van IOFs behandelt coöperaties als zijnde IOFs. Tot nog toe ontbreekt het 
aan methoden van prestatiemeting van coöperaties die rekening houdt met het gegeven dat 
coöperaties de doelen van de leden nastreven. Tevens is er in de huidige literatuur over 
Europese zuivelverwerkende bedrijven geen empirische ondersteuning voor het mogelijke 
effect van de lidoriëntatie van coöperaties op de financiële ratios.     
Het doel van deze thesis is het meten en vergelijken van de prestaties van coöperaties 
met die van IOFs, rekening houdend met de verschillen in oriëntatie tussen deze 
bedrijfstypen. Deze studie maakt allereerst een uitgebreid overzicht van de relevante 
theoretische en empirische literatuur. Tevens maakt deze studie gebruik van econometrische 
technieken om inzicht te verschaffen in verschillen in financiële variabelen tussen coöperaties 
en IOFs in de zuivelsector in de EU, en om de prestaties van coöperaties te meten en 
vergelijken met IOFs, op een wijze die rekening houdt met de verschillende doelen van 
coöperaties en IOFs. De empirische toepassingen van deze studie zijn gericht op 
zuivelverwerkende bedrijven in België, Denemarken, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Ierland en 
Nederland.  
De literatuur omvat een groot aantal studies die de prestaties van coöperaties 
vergelijken met die van IOFs. Hoofdstuk 2 stelt enkele classificaties voor van theoretische en 
empirische studies en maakt duidelijk welke discrepanties er bestaan tussen deze twee 
stromingen. De theoretische literatuur hanteert drie verschillende visies op de coöperatie: een 
verticale integratie van bedrijven, een onafhankelijke onderneming en een coalitie van 
bedrijven. Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt verschillende modellen van het economisch gedrag van 
coöperaties; modellen die enkelvoudige en meervoudige doelstellingen veronderstellen. In de 
empirische literatuur worden twee categorieën onderscheiden: studies gebaseerd op micro-
economische theorie en studies gebaseerd op accounting technieken. Geen van beide 
categorieën houdt rekening met de doelstellingen van de coöperatie, als een leden- 
georiënteerd bedrijf; in plaats daarvan wordt de coöperatie doorgaans beschouwd als een IOF.  
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt met empirische technieken of er verschillen zijn in financiële 
variabelen tussen coöperaties en IOFs in de zuivelverwerkende industrie in verschillende 
Europese bedrijven. Er wordt verondersteld dat de oriëntatie van coöperaties leidt tot 
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verschillen in financiële variabelen. Dit hoofdstuk gebruikt logistische regressie om 
verschillen te zoeken tussen coöperaties en IOFs tussen landen en in indicatoren als winst, 
schuldposities, operationele efficiëntie, groei van eigen vermogen en bedrijfsgrootte. Zoals 
verwacht worden enkele verschillen gevonden. Coöperaties zijn minder winstgevend, hebben 
hogere materiaalkosten, opereren efficiënter en hebben minder schulden dan IOFs. 
Verschillen tussen landen, gecorrigeerd voor financiële ratios zijn niet significant. De 
variantie in de gebruikte indicatoren is groter voor coöperaties dan voor IOFs, wat suggereert 
dat coöperaties heterogener zijn dan IOFs in termen van hun financiële indicatoren. 
Concluderend: coöperaties verschillen van IOFs in enkele financiële ratios en vooral in hun 
financiële positie. Coöperaties zijn beter toegerust op de komende uitdagingen voor de 
zuivelsector.  
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert de technische efficiëntie van coöperaties en IOFs. Aangezien 
coöperaties een andere oriëntatie hebben dan IOFs, wordt verondersteld dat IOFs een andere 
productiefrontier hebben dan coöperaties. Met de gekozen benadering  kan de technische 
efficiëntie worden bepaald t.o.v. de eigen frontier (intra-bedrijf efficiëntie).  Ook kan het 
verschil tussen de frontiers van IOFs en coöperaties worden bepaald: de catch-up component. 
De resultaten laten zien dat het verschil tussen de frontiers van coöperaties en IOFs statistisch 
significant is. Dit impliceert dat het veronderstellen van een gezamenlijke frontier tot 
misleidende inzichten leidt: de productie technologie (inclusief vermarkting van producten) 
van coöperaties is productiever dan die van IOFs. Coöperaties zijn echter wel minder efficiënt 
ten opzicht van hun eigen frontier dan IOFs en maken dus minder goed gebruik van hun 
productiepotentieel. Beide bedrijfstypen worden gekarakteriseerd door afnemende 
schaalopbrengsten, alhoewel coöperaties een veel grotere omvang hebben dan IOFs.  
Hoofdstuk 5 meet en vergelijkt de totale efficiëntie van coöperaties met die van IOFs in de 
zuivelverwerkende industrie. De totale efficiëntie bestaat uit allocatieve, technische en 
schaalefficiëntie en veronderstelt kostenminimaliserend gedrag voor de bedrijven. Daarnaast 
worden twee alternatieve hyperbolische efficiëntie-maatstaven ontwikkeld. De eerste 
hyperbolische maatstaf (het IOF model) veronderstelt dat bedrijven de output willen vergroten 
en de kosten van alle inputs willen verminderen. Het tweede model (het coöperatie model) 
komt tegemoet aan het doel van coöperaties door te veronderstellen dat zij output en de kosten 
van materialen (vooral melk) willen vergroten en tegelijkertijd de kosten van de overige 
inputs willen verminderen. De resultaten laten zien dat de technische efficiëntie van IOFs 
afneemt wanneer het coöperatie model wordt toegepast; de technische efficiëntie van 
coöperaties blijft daarentegen gelijk. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat het belangrijk is om de 
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doelstelling van het bedrijf zoals die voortvloeit uit de relatie met de eigenaar of 
transactiepartner, mee te nemen in de meting van de bedrijfsprestatie.  
Het verschil in oriëntatie tussen coöperaties en IOFs leidt tot verschillen in financiële ratios. 
Het is van cruciaal belang om rekening te houden met de doelstellingen van de leden van de 
coöperaties bij het meten van haar prestaties. Het meten van de prestaties van een coöperatie 
alsof het een IOF betreft leidt tot misleidende inzichten. 
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